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Abstract
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background Information
People are not the smartest bunch. No matter how smart security measures for com-
puters become, if they use a password, some user will give it out. It is a concept
that many users can simply not grasp; ”DO NOT GIVE OUT YOUR PASSWORD
TO ANYONE”. Now that seems like a simple enough request, however through social
engineering, an alarming number of users will give out their password to a third party
without realising what they have done.
When a malicious user knows a username/password pair for a system, they generally
can do whatever they please with it. Even if the account is a basic user or restricted
one, this can be used as a ”foot in the door” to launch a further attack on the system
from within the system itself.
Furthermore, no matter how good the security of a system is, it is only as good as the
password protecting it (Microsoft TechNet: 10 Immutable Laws of Security 2005). If
users are not forced to use reasonably secure passwords then the security of the system
cannot be guaranteed. There also are concerns about password expiration policies of
some enterprises; some requiring users to change passwords every month in cases. While
seeming to increase security, requiring these password changes so often can result in less
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security as users may begin to start jotting passwords down on post-it’s or in diaries;
”two people can keep a secret, but only if one of them is dead” (Microsoft TechNet:
10 Immutable Laws of Security 2005) or once a password is in a place other than the
user’s head, the password is not secret anymore.
So if a user cannot be trusted to keep their credentials for a system secret, how can the
security be maintained? Using a two (or in extreme cases a three) factor authentication
system will ensure this is the case.
Most people are familiar with a two-factor system already, namely ATM’s. To guar-
antee that someone is who they are, the machine requires something we know (our
PIN) and something we have (our card). There are many other security systems, such
as biometric devices that authenticate via fingerprints, our eyes and even our voice.
Smartcard authentication is very popular amongst enterprises, especially due to the
crypto functions being performed on the card itself rather than in software on the
computer.
It is only recently where we have seen the rapid growth of both two-factor or token
based authentication and biometric identification. For under $100 it is now possible to
purchase a stand-alone Microsoft fingerprint scanner which simply connects to a USB
port and allows users to logon to their computer simply by their finger. Some USB
storage devices now incorporate a fingerprint scanner into their devices to ensure that
if the user either loses or has their device stolen, the data onboard cannot be (easily)
compromised. Smart-card readers are also widely available now, allowing people to
login to their computers using either a smartcard or a smartcard/PIN pair and thus
creating a two-factor authentication system.
There are some pitfalls with these devices. The main drawback is that smartcard based
systems require the owner/operator to purchase a smartcard for every user that wishes
to use the system. While the cost of a card is relatively inexpensive, it still requires
purchasing something that the user probably does not have already.
Biometrics may seem to alleviate this problem; after all, practically everyone has fingers
and it’s not likely that they will lose them anytime soon. As mentioned by Kay (2005),
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the two big problems with fingerprint authentication are that the fingerprint readers can
be fooled the majority of the time with gelatin moulds of fingers. Secondly, if someone
manages to reproduce a fingerprint either electronically or by creating a mould, there
is no way to revoke that fingerprint as it cannot be (essentially) changed (Kay 2005).
1.2 Project Objectives
The aim of this project is to implement an authentication system for computers using
off the shelf hardware, such as a USB Flash Disk.
It is also expected that investigations and discussions into other security devices avail-
able would be made. This would also be extended to security measures and protocols
that can be used today.
The project hopes to:
• Evaluate all the popular and influential forms of authentication means for com-
puters at home and in business currently available.
• Research studies done in the past regarding social engineering and password crack-
ing.
• Show the effects on social engineering when a two or three factor authentication
system is used instead of traditional username/password pairs.
• Evaluate common copy protection techniques to limit access to a (storage based)
security device by a malicious user.
• Create a token based, two factor authentication system using a USB Mass Storage
Device, such as a USB Thumb Drive and integrate this into a login manager using
PAM modules or a modified GDM.
• Show whether or not the device is a secure, robust authentication device for a
computer.
• Discuss implementation of the device on other Operating Systems.
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• Describe a network authentication architecture that can take advantage of the
hardware device to help increase overall security.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 details what Social Engineering is and how it affects computer security.
Approaches hackers use to gain information and strategies that can reduce the
effect of Social Engineering are explored.
Chapter 3 describes the current authentication systems that are available presently
for both home and enterprise computer systems. This chapter pays particular
attention to the field of Biometric Authentication including systems such as Voice
and Facial Recognition.
Chapter 4 discusses processes and technologies that are used in mainstream digital
media to prevent duplication. Methods of circumventing some of these protections
are also presented.
Chapter 5 shows how the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) system can be
used to allow an application to support multiple authentication subsystems, even
if not explicitly supported by the original application developer.
Chapter 6 discusses the different approaches that were available in designing the se-
curity device.
Chapter 7 describes the actual development of the USB security device, outlining
each component of the system.
Chapter 8 discusses the extension of the security device, adding features that would
appeal to enterprise users.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation and the overall results of the project. It details
the project goals that were achieved and discusses ones that were not. Finally it
discusses further work that may be commissioned for the device at a later date.
Chapter 2
Social Engineering Study
This chapter discusses what Social Engineering is and how it affects security. Tech-
niques that hackers use to gather information and exploit people are also mentioned.
Finally, strategies that can help reduce the effects of Social Engineering in a business
are presented including the use of multi-factor authentication systems, similar to the
device created in this project.
2.1 Background
Social Engineering (SE) is the practice of obtaining confidential information by the
manipulation of legitimate users (Social engineering (computer security) - Wikipedia,
the free encyclopedia 2005). SE has been made possible due to username/passwords
and the manipulation of users who are supposed to be protecting that data. While
business’s implement password security policies, it is mostly the users who are to blame
for networks being compromised. This is especially true for systems which have strong
security but users pick weak passwords (Microsoft TechNet: 10 Immutable Laws of
Security 2005). It goes onto say that many people simply use no password as their
password.
There are three forms of SE; they are, in order of occurrence:
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• Posing as IT staff or high-level management and telephoning users.
• Posing as high-level management and telephoning IT staff.
• Develop a relationship with a user or IT staff member and extract the information
directly.
The first, being the most common, works by the hacker telephoning a person at a
business and pretending to be from IT or someone higher up in the business. They
may then pretend there is a server issue and they are restoring the backups, but they
need the users’ name and password to verify that their files have been restored correctly.
The user will unknowingly give up these credentials thinking they are ensuring their
own data is not lost. Meanwhile, the hacker is using these credentials for whatever
purpose they wish.
The next form is where a hacker will pose as high-level management, calling the IT
staff directly and pretending to need some credentials due to some urgent matter. For
example, a hacker might telephone the IT staff and pretend to be a manager in a
panic because he cannot get access to his email and download his PowerPoint slides
for a presentation he is about to give. The hacker would then possibly threaten the IT
workers job if he does not reset the manager’s password at once.
Finally, the third form of SE, and by far the most deceitful form of social engineering.
This is where the hacker will develop a personal relationship with a user or IT staff
member, with the sole intention of “sweet-taking” the information out of the user
directly. This is deceitful because the user may develop a serious relationship with
the hacker and when the bond is broken (usually because the hacker has gotten the
information they need and has then disappeared), the user or in this case, the victim,
may become depressed or may even go as far as closing themselves off from social
activity.
A good social engineer has a few important qualities, the three most important ones
are:
• Good at acting/improvisation.
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• Good at reading people.
• Good researching abilities or information gathering techniques
If a social engineer is to be successful more times than not, they must be good at acting
or improvisation. They must be able to think on their feet in high pressure situations.
This becomes ever more important in a situation such as gathering information over the
telephone. A hacker may be trying to extract someone’s credentials from a helpdesk
operator. This operator may become suspect to the identity of the person requesting
the credentials. The hacker should not just hang up the phone and leave as this would
remove the doubt in the mind of the operator of the legitimacy of the request. It is by
far much better if the hacker can make up a plausible excuse and leave the conversation
much more calmly. One exit strategy can be simply the hacker pretends their credentials
are now working and thus there is now no need to have the password reset.
The ability to read people is another important quality for a social engineer. They
must be able to look at a mark or victim and know almost immediately what approach
will work the best to extract the information they need. One example of this is if the
hacker is posing as a courier while gathering information about the business, they may
notice the secretary is having trouble with their computer. This may show that the
secretary has poor computer skills and probably would not question any direction given
by someone posing as IT staff. So just by reading, who is possibly, the first person they
see upon entering a building, the hacker has a good chance of obtaining a username
and password which can be used to gain entry to the computer system and possibly
launch further attacks from the inside.
A social engineer is only as good as the information they know about their mark. It
is very important that they have a basic understanding of how the organisation works
internally. To improve their knowledge of the organisation, a hacker may phone the
business, poking for information related to something they need. This is usually met
with limited success as employees may start to suspect something is not quite right
when lots of questions are being asked. Another way is simply to use the internet to
find all the information available. This is once again usually of limited use as all the
information on corporate websites is only for the public’s interest.
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Failing to obtain the information using one of the above techniques, a social engineer will
resort to “dumpster diving”. This is where they will simply go through an organisations
waste bins looking for anything that can help them sound more credible while they are
conning. This works more times than not because of the lax security that usually
surrounds enterprises’ waste bins. The social engineer will look for anything that can
help, this includes:
• Draft reports
• Memos
• Letters
• Meeting minutes
• Internal phone directories
Internal phone directories are highly sought after, especially in large organisations.
Most of the time, these will have the persons full name, position in the company, and
phone number. This allows the hacker to target their con directly to the person to
whom it is suited, rather than going through layer and layer of helpdesk operators and
assistants, possibly making a mistake through one of the levels as the call is escalated.
Managers seem to think that if their staff are put through an IT introduction and they
touch on the importance of keeping usernames and passwords secure, then there is no
need to worry about computer security. They are so wrong. A survey conducted in the
UK back in 2003 showed that “Ninety per cent of office workers at London’s Waterloo
Station gave away their computer password for a cheap pen, compared with 65 per cent
last year” (Leyden 2003). That is a staggering statistic. The same survey went on to
say that workers were asked bluntly “What is you password?” (Leyden 2003) and 75
percent of the employees gave it out immediately.
In the year following, another unrelated survey was conducted using a similar technique.
The results this time were just as alarming; “70 per cent of people would willingly trade
their computer password for a bar of chocolate.” It then went on to say that “... 34
per cent would give away their password for nothing!” (Grammeman 2004).
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2.2 Security Considerations
It is very important that management take educating their employees about social
engineering seriously. The staff are the ones who will have an interaction with the
hacker most of the time so its critical that they can identify when they are being
conned and take appropriate action.
There are two sides to social engineering assaults, physical and psychological. Physical
attacks are catered for in most cases for many businesses, but they fail to raise awareness
to the psychological ones. Granger (2001) talks about removing the responsibilities of
staff to make judgment calls in certain situations. That way, if the hacker asks for
something that is against the security policy, the employee must deny the request. It
should also be part of employee training that they are taught to identify SE attacks.
This is by far one of the most effective techniques against SE as every employee is
actively watching out for any suspicious activities.
Physical security is not that hard to maintain effectively. Obvious things such as ID
cards for every employee and if security is paramount, ensuring that these are checked
and verified upon entering and exiting the building (Granger 2001). Ensuring that all
doors that require security cards to access are kept closed at all times. This may require
employees once passed through the doors to wait a moment while the door shuts to
ensure it locks.
Network points should also be secured. This is usually done in large businesses by
disabling the port on the switch or router directly. Smaller businesses may simply
disconnect the port from the patch panel in their equipment racks. If this is not done
a hacker may simply be able to walk in and plug a laptop into the network and gain
access. Wireless networks are another concern for network security. They pose a much
larger problem for the business as there is no medium that can be locked down like a
wired network. This implies that strong encryption must be used over wireless links, not
using Wired Equivalent Privacy or WEP; it is by far not secure. Wifi Protected Access
(WPA) can be considered secure when bundled with a central RADIUS authentication
server.
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Still the transmissions can be intercepted and if data is highly sensitive then wireless
networks should be banned. This can be enforced by deploying access-points with rouge
network scanning features. These devices can then jam or disable the unauthorised
network automatically (Cisco Self-Defending Network - Cisco Systems 2005).
Physiological attack prevention is more difficult to implement effectively, but by no
means impossible. This can only be achieved by training employees on a regular basis.
Most companies have a security talk or presentation for new employees but leave it
at that. They do not have ongoing, updated sessions and they definitely do not keep
social engineering in the minds of their employees. If staff become lax about security,
even for a few days, this is more than enough time for a social engineer to compromise
many areas of a company.
The other important concern raised is that “A computer is only as secure as the ad-
ministrator is trustworthy”. Anyone who has administrator privileges on a system can
do whatever they want and cover their tracks so no one can detect them. There is no
security on a network if the administrator cannot be trusted. This is very important,
especially for larger organisations which may have huge amounts of confidential data
residing on servers. In these cases, background checks are usually performed on people
who have access to critical data. Of course, not every business has the resources to
check into every new administrator but if security is paramount, it should be carried
out. If a business uses some form of two-factor authentication for its users, rouge ad-
ministrators will have a harder time trying to spoof accounts, especially if the business
uses biometrics. It will not (usually) help keep files anymore secure as administrators
in most situations have full access to all files on any given server.
Another related Microsoft TechNet article “10 Immutable Laws of Security Adminis-
tration” talks about security concerns and observations that are more targeted towards
administrators than users. One such is “Law 2: Security only works if the secure way
also happens to be the easy way” (Microsoft TechNet; Security Administration: 10 Im-
mutable Laws 2005). There is no point trying to convince management to approve new
authentication systems if they are too expensive or would require too much training for
the users to interface with effectively. Most of the time, businesses will regard the secure
way to be username and passwords. These are still the dominant form of authentica-
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tion because in essence they are the easy way; especially when you consider that nearly
every operating system ever comes straight out of the box with everything necessary to
authenticate based on passwords. The other law that is of interest in the context of this
project is “Law 6: There really is someone out there trying to guess your passwords”
(Microsoft TechNet; Security Administration: 10 Immutable Laws 2005). No matter
how secure your network, nearly all are susceptible to password-guessing attacks. While
good passwords that are changed regularly can afford good protection from this type
of attack, it is not 100% secure. If a business uses a two-factor based system, such as
a smart card, or a form of secure biometrics, they will be effectively immune to these
attacks.
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2.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter clearly showed how Social Engineering can undermine the security of any
password protected system. The three most common forms of SE were discussed along
with the qualities that make a good Social Engineer. These qualities enable them to
extract priviledged information out of users over 70 per cent of the time.
Methods of reducing SE were also discussed. There are two aspects to social engineering
attacks; these being physical and psychological attacks. Most businesses have little
or no trouble implementing protocols for reducing physical attacks, yet neglect the
psychological ones. Sometimes these psychological attacks can be reduced by simply
implementing policies where by users can not make judgment calls on certain issues; if
the policy denies a certain type of request, then the user must adhere to that.
Chapter 3
Current Authentication Methods
This chapter details various authentication devices used presently on computer systems.
Smart Cards are briefly discussed before a detailed look into Biometric Authentication is
undertaken. This includes evaluation of a number of Biometric Authentication Systems
such as Eye Scanning and Facial Recognition.
3.1 Two and Three Factor Authentication
When someone says do you have a two factor authentication system in place or have
you ever used a two factor authentication system, most people will shrug their shoulders
and say “I don’t know”; yet almost everyone has at some stage in their life used a two
or even three factor authentication system without even knowing it.
Debit or credit cards are by far the most common form of two factor authentication.
To withdraw money or to pay for purchases you need two things; something you have,
this being the actual card; and something you know, this is of course either the PIN or
the cardholders signature for debit and credit cards respectively.
The same principle applies to cheques. For a transaction to be successful, two things
are required, a cheque and a signature. Cheques however, can become three factor
authentication based when a bank or a cashier asks for some identification, such as a
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drivers license. This is done to further ensure that the person writing the cheque is
indeed who they claim to be.
In computer security terms, the base principles of two-factor authentication are still the
same; something we have and something we know. This can be extended to three-factor
authentication by the addition of some biometric identification, such as a fingerprint.
Now to access a system you need something you know, something you have and some-
thing you are.
3.2 Smart Cards
Authentication-wise, these work in a similar fashion to debit cards; you need the smart
card and usually a PIN to gain access to a system. Smart cards go one step further
than traditional magnetic strip cards by having a small embedded processor integrated
into the card. These usually perform cryptography functions using a small amount of
on-board memory. The point of this is to protect the actual key or key code on the
card from whatever is requesting authentication.
This abstraction makes smart card authentication quite secure. Since there is no way
to access the key on the card (short of scraping the top off one of the RAM chips
and using an electron microscope to read the data atom by atom!), the key cannot
be compromised. If something requests authentication, it can send a challenge to the
on-board processor and the processor can check the key before returning a success or
failure to the initial challenge.
3.3 Biometrics
While smart card authentication is quite good in itself, it is coming under threat by
another form of authentication, this being biometrics. Social engineering (computer
security) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (2005) defines biometrics as “the study of
automated methods for uniquely recognizing humans based upon one or more intrinsic
physical or behavioral traits”.
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Within the vast field of biometrics there are a few predominant authentication systems:
• Fingerprints
• Hand geometry
• Voice recognition
• Eye scanning
Iris
Retina
• Facial recognition
3.3.1 Fingerprints
Identifying a person by fingerprints has been a trusted means for many years. Police
by far are the biggest users of fingerprint identification, using them almost exclusively
(until the advent of DNA identification) for placing criminals at crime scenes when no
witnesses were around. Large businesses have been using fingerprint based authentica-
tion systems for years now with good results. Now though, this technology is making
its way into end user’s equipment. For example, Microsoft market a line of fingerprint
authentication peripherals such as keyboards and mice with fingerprint readers built
right into the device. Many PDA’s and laptops are now available with fingerprint
scanners integrated directly into the device.
While this sounds great for consumers who wish to secure their systems better, there are
some drawbacks to these ”consumer-friendly” scanners. Firstly some are slow; this is
also dependent on the computer’s specifications and secondly they are more susceptible
to counterfeit fingerprints.
A Japanese firm (find out who again) decided to test some consumer-grade fingerprint
readers. They began by lifting a fingerprint off one of the reader’s scanning plates.
This was not done by dusting for the print and using some contact adhesive sheet, but
by taking a photograph of it! They then used the photograph of the print to create a
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gelatinous mould of the finger. Once the finger was created, they set out to test the
fingerprint readers. They were able to fool the readers and gain entry to the computer
system 80 percent of the time. This shows that a basic fingerprint scanner is by no
means foolproof, especially if it protects something that someone wants to get their
hands on badly.
Not wanting to have their system’s fooled or opened under wrong circumstances, the
Department of Energy in America has pulse or heart beat detectors along with pressure
sensors in their finger and hand authentication systems. This is to combat the use of
finger or hand moulds or to prevent a criminal from cutting off someone’s fingers or
hands to gain entry to the facility. If someone does try to use a severed limb, the system
will fail to detect a pulse and also the limb may seem flatter due to the loss of blood
and as such, will fail to authenticate the user.
3.3.2 Hand Geometry
Hand geometry or hand authentication has been used for over 20 years. It is a reliable,
non-invasive form of accepted authentication. How it works is by measuring the distance
between known points on the palm of ones hand. These are quite distinctive from person
to person and as such form the basic of hand geometry authentication. Many public
places use this form of identification, airports being one large users. Hand-prints help
speed up business people upon re-entry to the country. They simply swipe a card
and scan their hand and they are admitted without the need for an official to inspect
credentials.
Another use for this technology is in more harsh work environments, such as mechanical
workshops or mines. Since finer details such as fingerprints are not needed, employees
with dirty hands can still be authenticated successfully. Probably the biggest user of
hand identification is the US Prison System. Not only are the staff scanned for access,
but also the inmates and visitors. This means that at any one time an audit can be
conducted on the facility and everyone accounted with a relatively high accuracy. This
is especially important in situations such as a riot by inmates or an evacuation of the
facility.
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3.3.3 Voice Recognition
Voice recognition technology is an ever changing field in biometrics. The two main
forms are authentication and dictation or text recognition. It is quite difficult for a
computer system to understand a user when they are talking and translate the spoken
words into text, especially with the correct punctuation and emphasis. This is due to
the many subtleties in human speech and as a result makes naturally speaking to a
computer a very mean feat to accomplish.
Recognising a small phrase or group of words accurately is vastly easier to do. By
working on a much, much smaller subset of words, say four or five, algorithms can
distinguish with a good degree of certainty any given person. Many large businesses use
this technology to protect access to computer rooms and vaults. Once again, because
this is a non-invasive authentication method, end users generally have no reservations
about embracing it.
3.3.4 Eye Authentication
Eye authentication is a relatively new system in mainstream business. It has been
around for many years but its use was severely limited to large businesses that have
something quite secure to protect or limit access too. Many people have concerns
about using an eye scanner. While some systems allow users to stand a few feet from a
scanner or camera, other more secure systems usually require users to place their faces
in a guide or position their eyes directly in front of a scanner like a pair of binoculars.
This is an invasive check; some people fear this and as a result, seem to shy away when
given the option to use it.
There are two methods of eye authentication, the first being retina based scanning. This
involves scanning the retina; using the blood vessels as unique identification markings.
Due to the need to scan the back of the eye, a user needs to be standing quite close to
the scanner and must keep the eye as still as possible. The results are quite accurate
though and as such have been used for over 15 years with only minor issues; namely
that retina patterns can change over time. This may be due to blunt trauma to the eye
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or the head or simply just aging. As a result of this it is important that the system is
kept updated with ongoing “refresher” scans.
The second method, iris based scanning, is a better form of eye authentication. In this
method, the iris is photographed and the structure analysed using computer algorithms.
There are two advantages to this system. Firstly, it is less invasive than retina scanning.
All that is needed is a good quality camera and the iris pictures can be taken from a
short distance from the user. This also means that iris scanning can be done sometimes
without users knowing, good for tracking people through a public place. Secondly, a
person’s iris does not change over time, similar to a fingerprint, and as a result does not
need to be retrained on a regular basis. Furthermore, identical twins can be identified
accurately using iris analysis, making unique and accurate authentication possible when
fingerprints and sometimes retina scanning cannot.
3.3.5 Facial Recognition
Finally we come to facial recognition. This is a relatively new field when compared with
much older technologies such as fingerprinting and retina scanning. Facial recognition
uses pictures of a persons face as the basis for a uniqueness algorithm. An algorithm
attempts to map points on a face which do not change with either age or with disguises.
This means good facial recognition systems should be able to identify someone with
glasses on or who has changed their complexion to fool security.
The big problem with these systems is they require a lot of computing power to check
faces, especially when there are many cameras all feeding many frames per second. To
make matters worse, each frame may have several people in view, further complicating
the system. Performance issue like this can be handled in one of three ways usually:
• Reduce the video feeds frame rate or pause it entirely
• Reduce the image quality
• Increase the computing power
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Reducing the frame rate is usually the preferred choice. Image quality is not sacrificed
and as long as there is no need to capture all the extra intermediate frames that we are
now ignoring, we can save on storage space when archiving the footage.
Reducing the image quality is usually a bad idea. Doing this usually results in a
reduction in recognition accuracy. Unfortunately there are some situations where this
has to be done, such as when a camera is mounted in a remote location and the only
communications infrastructure available is either a dialup or low-speed wireless modem.
In a larger, more mature area, such as a stadium or airport, reducing the image quality
will ease transmission and storage of the footage; it also will ease the load on the facial
recognition system as less data needs to be processed in any given video frame but the
accuracy will suffer. The most common way to reduce image quality is to compress
the image, usually by use of a video compressor/decompressor (codec). Most video
codecs are lossy, meaning that once the camera compresses the video for transmission,
elements of the video are lost and cannot be recovered.
Increasing the computing power to handle the load is the other solution. This is usually
only done if it is of the utmost importance that faces be matched accurately and timely.
An Olympic Game is the sort of magnitude that would warrant a large server upgrade;
traffic and street cameras in a town are something that would not usually be upgraded.
There is some hope though. A new breed of ”smart” cameras are starting to appear.
One company in America, Oxford Microdevices, has cameras that are outfitted with
”inexpensive but very powerful Digital Signal Processor chips” (Cringely 2005). These
cameras then can actively identify people from many distinguishing features. This
means no more monitoring hundreds of video screens and no more server farms to do
analysis from the cameras. When a camera finds something of value it then alerts a
command centre and begins to stream the video. That’s the brilliance of this system,
when you deploy 100 cameras, you are also deploying the processing power needed to
monitor those cameras. Do not think that because the camera has some intelligence
and it uses a few cheap DSP chips it is more a gimmick than a feature; most of these are
running at ”more than 50 gigaflops - 50 billion floating-point operations per second”
(Cringely 2005).
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3.4 Commercial Authentication Systems
There are many different authentication means available for computer systems, but only
a handful are available for mainstream markets. Furthermore, only a small number of
these work under operating systems other than Windows. Smartcards seem to be the
only universal operating system authentication device; working in most OS’s and many
embedded devices.
3.4.1 Cryptocard
Cryptocard have bridged the operating system gaps with their UB-1 USB Authentica-
tion tokens and their Linux-supported smart card software. The USB token is really
a smart card and a smart card reader integrated into something the size of a USB
thumb drive; however these devices are not cheap, running in the order of $300 US for
a five pack. That is not the final cost though, as five licences on the authentication
software are required. When purchased in a starter pack, the five USB tokens and the
software with licences cost $500 US. Additional licences cost in the order of $1250 US
for 25 licences; not overly expensive for a large business, but definitely for a smaller
one (CRYPTOCard Corp 2005).
3.4.2 Dekart Logon
Dekart is another company who specialise in authentication solutions for home and
business users. Their authentication system is called Logon and can use basically any
media or authentication device to secure a system. It has no Linux support and licences
are about $40 US for personal or business use. The Dekart system may be less secure
than the Cryptocard system, especially when using the USB flash drive or CD/floppy
disk authentication methods; as the tokens may be copied easier off these devices
than the dedicated smartcard-like architecture of the Cryptocard system. However,
for Windows-based authentication, the Dekart system supports an impressive number
of devices including hardware USB tokens, Smartcards, and any other generic storage
devices such as USB thumb drives, CD’s etc. It can also interfaces with a number of
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Biometric verification devices (Free download - secure login for Windows - USB flash
disk/smart card, biometric login with Dekart Logon 2005).
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3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the main types of two- and three-factor authentication systems
currently available. Smart cards are a reliable form of authentication and have the
added advantage of being non-invasive for the user.
A few common forms of Biometric Authentication were then discussed. Fingerprint
scanning is the latest form with devices now cropping up, sporting fingerprint authen-
tication. The problem with these devices though is they can sometimes be tricked by
false fingerprints. Hand geometry is a valid form of authentication but lends itself to
larger security installations such as vaults, rather than portable devices such as PDA’s.
User identification by voice was also mentioned. Used mainly for phone-based ser-
vices, such as telephone banking, it is another non-invasive form of authentication.
Conversely, one of the Eye scanning techniques is invasive; this being retina-based
scanning. This method requires users to stand quite close to the scanner and remain as
still as possible. The other Eye scanning technique uses the iris to distinguish between
users. This method is much less invasive that retina-based scanning which is better for
the user. It is also able to discriminate between users much better than other biometric
methods, so well in fact that it can distinguish between identical twins. Finally Facial
Recognition was discussed including technological advances in processing ability.
Chapter 4
Copy Protection Techniques
This chapter discusses copy protection techniques used on digital media. A few common
copy protection systems are detailed. Methods of defeating these protections are also
given. In addition, the application of copy protection to the USB security device is
mentioned.
4.1 Duplication Prevention
There are many different copy protection systems in place today to protect digital
media. Music compact discs and computer programs or games are the biggest users
of copy protection. Companies do not want people duplicating their media; copying
songs, movies or games and reducing their profits.
The two big names in CD/DVD copy protection are SafeDisc and SecuROM, owned
by Macrovision and Sony respectively. These two methods, along with many others,
are used to secure primarily PC software, especially game titles, from unauthorised
duplication.
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4.1.1 SafeDisc
SafeDisc protection is a software based system whereby a digital signature is embedded
into the disc by a laser beam. Then the executable for the software is encrypted with
a loader program. When executed, the loader checks for the authentication signature,
and if it is available, decrypts the executable and runs it.
The actual program executable is stored in a .icd file for SafeDisc 1. The main exe-
cutable is merely only an authentication wrapper that does the signature checks and
the decryption of the .icd file. Under SafeDisc 2, the encrypted binary .icd file and
other key support libraries are embedded in the loader or authentication wrapper. The
wrapper or loader itself is encrypted as well, decrypting itself upon execution. Once this
has occurred it then loads a kernel driver named secdrv.sys. On a Windows NT-based
operating system, this driver is used to detect the presence of a debugger. If one is
found or it detects the presence of software breakpoints in kernel functions, the decryp-
tion of the loader will fail and prevent the decryption and execution of the protected
application. When the loader has been decrypted successfully, it checks the CD/DVD
for the digital signature “using direct SCSI operations on the CD driver” (SafeDisc
FAQs 2002). Once the key is verified, the .icd is decrypted and execution is transferred
over to it.
This sounds impressive but it is really just an inconvenience for someone who wishes
to duplicate a game or a program. Anyone with a CD/DVD recorder that can burn
in disc-at-once (DAO) RAW mode and software that supports this (such as CloneCD)
can defeat SafeDisc protection. Furthermore, people have gone onto creating software
that can remove the SafeDisc protection from programs.
4.1.2 SecuROM
SecuROM uses a similar protection technique to SafeDisc, however the software that is
being protected is usually aware of this, unlike some SafeDisc applications. New versions
of SecuROM also support “Trigger Functions”, similar in function to the features found
in the SafeDisc API . These allow programmers to place many authentication requests,
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all of which can be customised in any way, throughout their program. This attempts to
create a more secure copy protection system, as opposed to single check systems (CD
Media World - CD/DVD Protections - CD/DVD Copy Protections - CD/DVD 2005).
Most of these systems also have facilities in place to check whether the media currently
in use is a mastered disc or recordable medium, such as a CD-R.
While SafeDisc protection embeds a digital signature into “defect sectors” which are
designed to be hard to read yet can be read by a good CD recorder, SecuROM 4.8
and greater use a different approach. Data is stored on an optical disc in a large spiral
formation, starting off small from the centre of the disc and ending up large when near
the outer edge. Since the spiral varies in size throughout the disc, there are measurable
differences in read times for the CD drive to read a sector from one area to another.
SecuROM exploits this fact by using the time taken to read two sectors as the key. If
the delays do not match the set pattern, the disc is deemed copied or corrupt.
How this protection can work is because CD-R’s have this spiral track already embedded
into them when manufactured. The optical dye is impregnated into this track and
changes when the CD is recorded and thus, the time taken to read one sector to another
is fixed. The original track cannot be duplicated because the target medium already
has an invalid track before the CD is even written. It is impossible to make exact 1-to-1
copies of SecuROM discs.
4.1.3 Laserlock
Another company, MLS Laserlock International, has similar based CD/DVD protection
systems however they use distributed corrupted blocks on the disk, 20MB of them on
a typical CD-R. In these corrupted blocks, they hide what they call “good data”,
presumably the physical signature for the encryption software. They also mention
support for protecting memory cards, a technique which may be useful on a USB
storage device. Unfortunately, this seems to be a relatively new product for them and
as such their site says nothing more than “Available Soon”.
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These techniques, for the most part, are reasonably secure. Unfortunately, they are
let down because while authentication signatures are hidden on the disc, they still
need to be read by the CD-ROM drive and because of this, it is possible to create
working copies of most titles with a good CD recorder. Lite-On (amongst others) have
CD recorders that are able to clone most copy protected games perfectly due to their
ability to read and write sub-channel data and write discs in RAW modes (DAO RAW)
using specialty cloning software. SafeDisc protection can be defeated with little effort
using this method.
It is also possible to make working copies of SecuROM discs. These copies are not
1-to-1 copies but for the most part, they will work as intended on most CD/DVD
drives. Software such as Alcohol 120% or Blindwrite’s Blindread have a feature that
can “monitor these delays and write them down in a file” (Zarathustra 2002), these
delays being the sector read delays. Under Alcohol 120% this feature is called Data
Positioning Measurement or DPM. These measurements are then stored in a separate
file that virtual CD/DVD emulators, such as Daemon Tools, can use to present what
appears to be a perfectly valid CD image to an application.
To actually create a physical copy (say to a CD-R) of a SecuROM disc, the reading
delay needs to be simulated. The most common way to achieve this is to burn the same
sector twice. There is no problem doing this except the sector number must also be
set identical. Since there are now two physical sectors with basically the same address,
the disc can no longer be considered to be technically a CD-R as it does not adhere to
the standard. Most optical drives will detect the problem though and only return one
sector, effectively fooling SecuROM into believing the delays are real.
While these techniques are not fool-proof for the determined hacker, they do keep
honest people honest and definitely help keep piracy lower than what it would be.
Furthermore, these systems can really only be applied to ISO9660 based media, so
CD-ROM and DVD-ROM discs are the only medium that can benefit.
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4.3 Application to the USB Security Device
Copy protection is even more important in security devices. There must be some
method in place eventually to try to prevent unauthorized duplication of the token.
Unfortunately, the three products above can only be used on optical media; they have
no application to a UMSD as they measure characteristics that belong to CD’s or
DVD’s.
Furthermore, since UMSD are designed to be quite open, there is no real way to prevent
the duplication of the token. The authentication data may be hidden in the filesystem
directly (Chapter 7) to obscure it, but this is still not immune to a low-level copy, such
as dd under Linux.
One can employ some techniques to the actual token data to reduce the effects of dupli-
cated however. The best method is similar to a rolling code in a vehicles keyless entry
system. The remote control generates a code which seems random to anyone eaves-
dropping on the transmission except for the receiver in the vehicle. It is programmed
with the same code algorithm as the remote and knows what code to expect next time.
In fact, most systems know what to expect for the next few hundred transmissions.
This is done to ensure accidental presses of the remote when away from the vehicle do
not remove the numerical link between car and remote.
An access code can be embedded into the token and updated on every logon. This code
would be recorded in the system’s database. When the user comes back to logon, the
system would check this code, see if it what should be there and if it is valid, replace the
code with another. This is in essence what a single-use password sets out to achieve.
If someone then duplicates the token, they must login with it before the real token
is used again or else their code will be invalidated and a new code stored on the real
token. In terms of achievable duplication prevention, this is probably the best that can
be achieved with a UMSD. This could be supplemented with a check of the model and
brand of the device from its ROM. While not foolproof, it would increase security as a
hacker would need the exact make and model of UMSD to be successful.
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4.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed in detail the two biggest forms of copy protection currently
available for optical media; SafeDisc and SecuROM. SafeDisc embeds a digital signature
on a disc by deliberately corrupting sectors.
Early versions of SecuROM used a similar technique however from version 4.8, it
switched to a different method. The time taken to read two known sectors from a
disc formed the basis of the new verification system. This ment for SecuROM that
every manufactured blank disc, whether CD or DVD, would be automatically deemed
invalid when recorded with a SecuROM protected application.
Finally, methods of securing the token on the USB security device were evaluated.
Embedding a random access code in the token and updating this on every logon is
probably the best protection that can be used on a standard UMSD.
Chapter 5
Authentication Subsystems in
Linux
This chapter discusses the authentication systems that can be used in Linux-based
distributions. It then goes on to show how PAM is used to bridge the gaps in these
systems and help programs use the available authentication systems effectively.
5.1 Current Systems Available
Currently there are not a great number of authentication systems for Linux. A short
list includes but is not limited to:
• /etc/passwd file
• Shadow passwords
• LDAP
• NT Authentication
• Kerberos
• Network Information Service
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The problem with all these systems is that they require the client programs to have
support built in for each system. So if a developer of one program decides that shadow
password authentication is all that is needed, all the users of that program are locked
into using them too. What if the user wants to authenticate against an NT server or
a LDAP server? They can’t; either they change to a program that does authenticate
against what they want or they stop using the program.
This caused lots of problems, especially with mixed operating system environments
such as computer labs. User accounts may be stored on an NT server machine which
was fine for the Windows computers, but not fine for the Linux or Mac ones. So then
a NIS server would be setup to authenticate the Linux clients and a Mac OS server for
the Mac clients. That is all well and good until users need to be added to the system;
there are now three user databases that need to be updated simultaneously. To make
matters worse, when a user changes their password or an account is to be disabled,
again three databases need to be updated to reflect these changes. This is very tedious,
especially when there are hundreds or thousands of users.
5.2 PAM to the Rescue
The Pluggable Authentication Module System (PAM) puts an end to all this. PAM
separates the authentication methods from the client program both simplifying the pro-
gram code and improving security or “to separate the development of privilege grant-
ing software from the development of secure and appropriate authentication schemes”
(Morgan 2002). Program code is simplified as developers do not need to bother cod-
ing routines to interface with the different authentication systems. All that needs to
be included is code to interface with the PAM application programming interfaces or
API’s. This means more focus can be spent on the actual program itself rather than the
security of it. Security is improved as tested and trusted modules are used to handle
the authentication requests instead of modules coded by the developer. This helps to
ensure that simple exploits do not crop up in security-sensitive programs that may have
been programmed by more inexperienced developers.
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PAM works by breaking down any authentication methods and tasks into modules that
can be stacked together or “pluggable”. This makes PAM a very flexible authentication
system. It can be used to mix and match different authentication databases together
across different platforms thus allowing us to have a single user database across both
Windows and Linux machines.
PAM handles four main tasks related to authentication and user management. These
are:
• authentication management
• account management
• session management
• password management
Authentication handles the identification of the user, whether this is prompting them
for a password, smartcard or other authentication means. It also handles the escalation
of privileges through some of its own procedures. Account handles non-authentication
related functions. This includes resource access, location-based and time of day access.
Session is responsible for pre- and post-logon tasks, such as opening a log file, creating
temporary directories or some passing of data from one program to another. Password
handles “updating the authentication token associated with the user” (Morgan 2002)
There is usually one Password handling module for every Authentication method spec-
ified.
Each of these module types (auth, account, session and password) has a control-flag
associated with it. This lets PAM know what should happen on a module success
or failure. Since PAM lets users stack many modules together, sometimes even with
the same name but different parameters, it is important that the control-flags let PAM
distinguish between and transfer control in a sensible matter. These module successes or
failures are not passed to the application that requested authentication; rather a success
or fail summary result is passed once PAM relinquishes control to the application.
There are five control flags which are supported in all versions of Linux-PAM, four
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of which are module modifiers and one to aid in configuration of many PAM-aware
programs. The flags are:
• required
• requisite
• sufficient
• optional
• include
Required specifies that the success of this module is required for the overall success of
all the similarly named modules. It is important to note that if a module does fail, this
failure will not be noticed until all the remaining modules with the same name have
been executed.
Requisite is similar to required in the sense that it must succeed to succeed overall
however if a module does fail, control is returned immediately to the application and
the return code is from the first required or requisite module to fail. Requisite is handy
when it is important to check something important related to a user’s logon before
they are authenticated, such as day of week for time-based restrictions or against lists
of banned users.
Sufficient indicates that the success of this module is sufficient to ignore processing
the other similarly named modules in the stack. It may be used when a hardware
based authentication device is used on the system such as a smartcard reader. The
smartcard interaction module may be given the “sufficient” flag to ensure we do not
need to process the other authentication modules such as passwords.
Ignore sets a module as begin non-critical to the success or failure of the authentication
request by the application. Modules marked this way are usually ignored by PAM
unless all other modules have not returned definite results, such as PAM IGNORE.
Include is not a module modifier, rather a syntax operator. It tells PAM to “include all
lines of given type from the configuration file specified as an argument to this control”
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(Morgan 2002). This allows users to create global PAM configuration files and include
relevant parts of each in the application’s PAM configuration.
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5.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed how PAM can be used to tie multiple authentication systems
together for a single application. PAM allows application developers to focus on the
features in their application rather than the security implementations. Furthermore,
PAM is hugely configurable, supporting a handful of basic control flags which allow for
some quite comprehensive authentication configurations. This allows system adminis-
trators to change the authentication system for any given PAM-aware application with
no consequence to the performance or reliability.
Chapter 6
Project Methodology
This chapter outlines the different approaches that could have been taken to create
each section of the device. Issues related to copy protection, encryption methods,
programming languages and device interfacing are discussed.
6.1 Importance of Copy Protection
Research in the copy protection area will be important for this project. USB Mass
Storage devices are inherently insecure due to their very open nature. This would
allow for quite easy duplication of tokens onto other storage devices. There are a few
methods employed by CD/DVD manufacturers, both in data and audio fields, to limit
copying and redistribution of material on these mediums. Investigation into a few of
the most common techniques/software would be performed. Another consideration is
the support of the protection scheme under other operating systems, such as MacOS
X and more importantly, due to the technical tasks in this project, Linux. This also
creates further considerations; due to Linux’s low level interfaces for hardware access,
we may find that many of the copy protection schemes can be circumvented under it.
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The largest part of the project will be the creation of the actual software to authenticate
from the USB device. This area will involve a few distinct paths of research:
• Suitable encryption methods
• Suitable programming languages
• Choice of target hardware, both computer and flash drive
• Research of authentication layers under Linux
• Preference of low level device handling
6.2.1 Encryption Methods
To ensure that the token/device cannot be compromised, it should have some form of
encryption. There are three main approaches to achieving this:
1. Create an encryption library from scratch using a simple cipher.
2. Use a freely available industry standard encryption library, dynamically linking
to it from the authentication software.
3. Use existing command line based encryption tools available for Linux.
Of the three approaches, the first is the most insecure and the most difficult. Creating
a secure encryption library basically from scratch could easily be a year long project on
its own and creating one as a sub-project is well out of the scope of this project. The
second and third approaches make more sense in a time-restricted task. Both are viable
alternatives which can achieve high levels of encryption security. The use of command
line tools would lend itself to be the most flexible solution, especially since the user
could substitute their preferred encryption program for the default one. This approach
also has the advantage that many programs could authenticate easily off the one token
6.2 Device Considerations 37
or key. Finally, the legal restrictions on encryption software in other countries are a
concern. Wherever possible, software and ciphers that are available in all countries
should be used in favour of encryption products with export restrictions.
6.2.2 Programming Languages
There are usually a handful of programming languages available to a developer that is
suitable for the task at hand; C/C++, Java, Visual Basic and more recently, C#. To
ensure ease of cross-platform portability, C/C++ is best suited for this project. While
Java has far better cross-platform portability, its use of a Virtual Machine severely
limits its direct access to hardware, which is essential to a secure authentication device.
C/C++ also has the advantage of the same compiler, GNU C Complier on Linux (as
gcc) and Windows (as MinGW or gcc provided through Cygwin emulation).
6.2.3 Target Hardware
The choice of target hardware needs to be considered, not so much for the computer,
but for the choice of USB Flash Drive. The computer is assumed to be a standard 32bit
x86 architecture based system with a USB controller (32 bit architecture is mentioned
intentionally as some crypto functions may behave differently on a 64 bit processor).
The USB drive, however, could be one of many hundreds of devices available. This can
then be extended to include other devices whose primary roles are not that of a USB
Mass Storage device but are secondary functions supporting a primary function, such
as the storage of photos in a digital camera or the storage of MP3 and OGG files in a
portable music player. For the time being, the focus will be on USB thumb drives as
the primary device for the storage of the token. Another factor that could increase the
security of the device is determining if some of the devices have unique (or semi-unique)
serial numbers in ROM onboard, this would allow the software to lock the token to a
particular hardware device and thwart most forms of token copying to other devices.
6.2 Device Considerations 38
6.2.4 Authentication Layers
Nearly all Linux distributions have an authentication layer that keeps the authenti-
cation systems separate from the programs that request authentication and on most
Linux systems, this is provided by PAM, the Pluggable Authentication Module system.
When a new authentication system is added to the system, if a PAM exists for it, then
any application that is PAM-aware can immediately use that new system for its au-
thentication. PAM saves developers - of both authentication systems and software that
requires authentication - a lot of time and effort; having a framework that can work
on different architectures to talk to different programs is a huge advantage. One other
advantage is that the quality of the code is improved due to the already secure nature
of PAM; the risk of creating bugs that reduce the effectiveness of the authentication
means is lower than the cost of creating the entire system from scratch.
One of the goals is to have the device working with a login manager, in our case the
Gnome Display Manager or GDM. Further research must be done to determine the
underlying authentication mean that GDM uses when granting access to a user. There
is a good chance that it uses PAM, which if this is the case, should not require too
much change to use a secondary authentication means.
6.2.5 Device Interface
Arguably the most difficult part of the project will be accessing the USB hardware
directly. Under Linux, direct access to the USB Flash Drive as a hard drive is rela-
tively straightforward, but accessing it as a USB device, independent of its actual role,
will be more difficult. Under Linux, this could be achieved via a kernel module that
sets-up a connection to the device and creates a device node in the /dev/ directory,
thus controlling direct access to the device from malicious users/programs. This may
be unnecessary if a suitable copy protection method can be found and successfully im-
plemented. Furthermore, we may not need any direct access to the device; this would
allow us to simply use the OS’s file system layer and access the token as a simple binary
file.
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6.3 Assessment of Consequential Effects
6.3.1 Sustainability Issues
With anything related to computers and technology, there is always the concern that
something will supersede a product. Whether it is CD writers being replaced by DVD
writers, parallel ATA drives being replaced by serial ATA drives, or even floppy discs
being replaced by memory cards or USB thumb drives, there is always something that
will come along and replace something else. For this reason, it is important that the
USB security device be forwards-compatible so users will not be disadvantaged both
financially and feature based. Forward or future-compatibility is usually ensured by the
use of firmware upgrades; allowing features to be added to the system at a later date
without requiring the purchase of an entirely new device. The only other way is if a
device is built using a technology that is unlikely to be removed from a computer system
in the foreseeable future. A keyboard is a good example of this. It is quite unlikely
that the keyboard will be removed from computers any time soon, or most probably
not until voice recognition technology reaches a stage where it is a useful and accurate
input technology. The same goes for USB. Pretty much every peripheral these days
can be connected to a computer via USB. Almost every digital camera, MP3 player,
printer, scanner, mouse and keyboard use USB for their interface to the computer. As
a consequence of this rapid uptake of USB interfaces, it is highly unlikely that USB
will be removed from computers for a very long time to come.
6.3.2 Safety Issues
It is important for any business who secures users data effectively that some way for
the business to gain access to that data quickly is available. This may be to check on an
employee’s progress for a task or to recover data of a recently fired employee from their
home drive. So there must be ways whereby the owner of the intellectual property,
which is being protected by our system, can gain legitimate access. This may involve
creating an administrator backdoor in the authentication system, for example, that
when provided with the correct (and usually more secure) administrator key/token,
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the administrator can access anything protected on the system. The concern here
though is that now there is a key/token that can bypass all the security measures -
what happens when this falls into the wrong hands (because it will eventually!)?
A related issue to this is fail-safe or backup authentication systems. Can we really
provide a backup system that, while more cumbersome to use, can still provide a similar
level of security that the primary means achieves? What if the fail-safe system asks
the user for their logon name, password and date of birth, would that be as secure as
a smartcard authentication or a USB based security device? Whatever backup system
is chosen, it is very important that it be able to match the security provided by the
device initially.
6.3.3 Ethical Issues
How can it be ensured that the system does not contain backdoors that can be exploited
by the programmer at a later date to gain unauthorised access? Could the code be
released under an open-source licence such as GPL. This way, anyone who had concerns
about the integrity of the system could audit the code. If the system is to be marketed
though, it is more likely that the code would be closed-source. While this will help to
generate profits, there is no real assurance for the users who purchase the system that
they are really secure. There is no way that most businesses could conduct a security
audit of the binary form of the software to ensure the integrity of both it and the
programmer/programming house. The system should be designed and programmed
with absolutely no backdoors, for this is a big ethics violation. This does not mean
override or full access codes/tokens should not be considered as many businesses would
like this ability in their systems. The distinction here is that a backdoor is a hidden
bypass or entry point in the system that can be exploited to gain unauthorised entry
whereas an override or full access code is a documented security override that can be
used by administrators of a network.
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6.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the different approaches that could have been taken with each
section of the device. Copy protection issues were investigated briefly. A number of
aspects related to the device including encryption methods and programming languages
were detailed. Finally a brief assessment of the consequential effects was included.
Chapter 7
A Hardware-Based Linux PAM
Security System
This section of the project deals with the programming aspects of the security device.
There are a number of components that make up the entire USB security system; these
are:
• A USB Mass Storage Device
• A Pluggable Authentication Module
• The Gnome Display Manager
• AutoFS
• Utility Programs
7.1 USB Mass Storage Device
To begin the project, a USB Mass Storage Device (UMSD) is needed for storage of
the authentication token. In all, there are no restrictions on what type of UMSD is to
be used. The most sensible choice is a small USB Flash Drive or USB Thumb Drive.
These devices can be purchased for under $50 in most cases and support both USB
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1.1 and USB 2 specifications (Thunderbird Computing :: Price Lists 2005). However
there is no reason why another device that shows up to a computer as a UMSD cannot
be used as the storage. Devices which include UMSD support include but are by no
means limited to:
• Digital Cameras
• MP3 Players
• Portable Hard Disk Drives
• PDAs
Any of these could be used as the device without any ill effects. This would help to
improve the security of the system; it would not be apparent to a thief that the digital
camera needs to be connected to the computer to gain access.
The other important consideration for the device is how the authentication token or
credentials would be stored. Three possible methods were identified:
• Use of an encrypted token
• Use of an encrypted filesystem
• Use of hidden areas of the disk
7.1.1 Encrypted Token
By far the easiest method is to use an encrypted token. This also provides the system
with the least protection against duplication as the token file can be copied with relative
ease from one device to another. Other than that, the token is an acceptable form of
credential storage. All that is needed to access the token is simple C file input/output
functions such as fopen, read and write. This allows our supporting utilities to be much
simpler when creating tokens and updating the system database.
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7.1.2 Encrypted Filesystem
The use of an encrypted filesystem is a little more difficult to implement but still
achievable under a Linux-based operating system. This method involves taking over the
entire block device and using it as one large file. The original filesystem (usually FAT)
is completely corrupted and the device cannot be used as a conventional storage device
again unless it is reformatted. Note the word “conventional”; it is possible to provide
some crypto-loopback storage on the device once the entire disk is encrypted. The last
100 MB of a 128 MB drive may be a disk image that once the user is authenticated by the
system, it is decrypted in memory and the user can access it from a designated mount
point. Once the user logs out, the disk is unmounted from memory, re-encrypted and
copied back to the device. This would give the user secure storage for the transporting
of sensitive documents and could be implemented seamlessly with the PAM so zero
user interaction is required.
7.1.3 Hidden Storage Areas
The use of hidden areas of the disk is by far the most difficult to implement but would
return the greatest payoff. If implemented correctly, there would be no visible evidence
that the device contains authentication credentials. In this method, authentication
data is stored in unused areas of the disk, areas such as the master boot record (MBR),
boot sector of the filesystem and other hidden or reserved areas of the filesystem.
The master boot record is arguably the easiest of the three methods. This is space
reserved at the start of the disk as part of the partition table where usually a boot
loader is placed. There should be little or no impact by placing a few bytes of data
here. The only concern is if the computer is booted with the device connected and the
system is capable of USB booting. The system may think the device is bootable and
start loading the MBR into memory. This is quite undesirable, especially if the data
loaded does correspond to some CPU instructions and the computer actually executes
something instead of hanging. One way around this may be to take a standard Linux
boot loader, say LILO (LInux LOader), customize it to pass the boot loading to the
first hard disc drive, install it on the device and place our authentication data just after
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it.
Hiding data in the boot sector of a filesystem is a similar task to hiding it in the MBR.
The only difference is that the MBR is queried when the system is booting if specified
in the boot sequence whereas the boot sector of a partition can only be queried if
asked directly by a boot loader or failing to query a MBR, the first boot sector will be
activated if it contains bootable code. Other than that, once we have the start of the
boot sector we can access it as if we were accessing a MBR.
There is one big problem when programs start playing in the MBR; anit-virus programs.
If anything other than the operating system (and sometimes the OS is not exempt from
the restrictions too!) attempts to access the MBR of any disc on a system, the anti-
virus software will detect this as a boot-sector virus attempting to replicate to other
drives and will deny access. Since we are using Linux for the time being, this is of no
real concern except if the device is used in Windows as well. If the anti-virus program
uses a technique known as heuristics to help detect new and unknown viruses, it may
decide that the changes made to the MBR of the device are in line with a boot-sector
virus and will alert the user accordingly.
Linux filesystems such as Ext2 or Ext3 (Linux 2nd and 3rd Extended Filesystems) store
what is known as a superblock backup several times throughout a formatted filesystem.
Since these are all backup copies, there should be no need to use them in the general
operation of the filesystem. One of these superblocks could be erased and authentication
data placed in its space. This would result in exceptionally good data hiding which
is immune to nearly all duplication processes (except for dd). On paper this sounds
like a great solution except that the operating system updates all the superblocks after
a change to the master superblock and as a result, the authentication data would be
constantly lost. The only way this method would work was if it is possible to allocate
the superblocks on a device and then remove one of them from the list of superblocks
without re-allocating the space to the filesystem. This is probably not achievable as
the location of superblocks is not usually stored as a list of known locations but rather
a formula that is evaluated with respect to the size of the device. By far an easier
method may be to simply mark with software bad sectors on the device. This has the
benefits of never being overwritten by the filesystem as it is a (semi) permanent no-go
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barrier.
7.2 A Pluggable Authentication Module
A PAM must be created to interface between the client applications (GDM) and the
authentication device. This module handles the following tasks:
• Loading the configuration file
• Verifying that the user exists on the system
• Checking that a no-logon file exists
• Opening the token off the device and performing an MD5 sum
• Comparing this calculated MD5 sum to the one stored in the database
To speed up the development of the PAM, the pam permit module was used as a
starting framework. The sole purpose of this module is to simply return PAM SUCCESS
whenever called. While it does have all four PAM sections defined (authentication,
account, session and password), it only has logic under the authentication management
functions. This code simply checks the user exists on the system then permits them
while all the other sections blindly return a PAM SUCCESS code. There is no problem
with this implementation as the definition of the module is indeed to always return
success. This module was chosen to build upon because the simplicity of its code and
layout makes initial testing of basic functions easier than programming a full module
from scratch.
Upon execution, the module loads the default configuration file, namely /etc/usbsecure.conf.
This file contains the path to the token database and to the mount point for the UMSD.
Also the path to the no-logon or deny file is read at this time. This configuration is
stored in a binary format, not plain ASCII text. A configuration structure is created
using the supporting utilities and the actual structure is stored in the file directly.
Listing 7.1: usb config struct Configuration Structure.
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#ifndef CONFIG H
#define CONFIG H
#define CONFFILE ”/mnt/homes/matthew/uni / p r o j e c t / e t c / usbsecure . conf ”
struct u s b c o n f i g s t r u c t {
char t o k e n f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
char d eny f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
char d b f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
} ;
#endif
Next the module sets out to verify that the user exists. The system does not want
to attempt to login someone who does not exist, especially if the system allows these
logins to occur and passes the root filesystem as the home directory. The call to
pam get user handles this. If the user is unknown to the system, a PAM USER UNKNOWN
value is returned and the module exits otherwise a PAM SUCCESS is returned and the
authentication can continue.
After the username is validated by the system, the module checks for a deny file. This
file is similar to the /etc/nologon file which prevents users from logging into a system,
especially useful when performing system maintenance on a live server. If this file
exists and it contains a ’k’ character (meaning ok to login) then authentication can
continue as normal. If any other character is found a PAM AUTH ERR is returned. This
deny feature is important in situations where a token may be compromised and it is
unknown which one exactly. The administrator can activate the deny file and prevent
all token logons until the situation is resolved. In this time, users will be simply forced
to use a backup authentication system, most probably a password.
Once the deny file condition has been passed, the module can begin reading the token.
To begin with the module loads the token database and attempts to locate the token
signature for the previously entered username. Even though the user is known to exist
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on the system at this point, the search can still fail if the user has not been granted
a corresponding token. If it is not found, a PAM AUTH ERR is returned. The token
signature is then passed along with the token path to the do md5 file function. This
function takes a file to compute the MD5 hash from and the expected MD5 hash and
returns 1 if they do not match and 0 if they do. If one is returned, the module once
again returns PAM AUTH ERR otherwise the success message is passed to the application
using the PAM conversation-¿conv function and a PAM SUCCESS is returned.
All the MD5 functions are supplied by external code found on the internet. Writing a
message digest algorithm and the resulting functions is not an easy task from scratch.
Most implementations rely on either transformation tables, bitwise binary math or
even both in some cases. It was decided that time would be better spent integrating
different parts of the authentication system together rather than attempting to write
a MD5 library.
7.3 The Gnome Display Manager
The Gnome Display (or Desktop in recent times) Manager (GDM) is one of the most
widely used graphical login manager for Linux distributions. On system boot-up, it
starts the Xorg or XFree86 Windowing System and presents the user with a login screen.
GDM is a logical choice for this project as it is a PAM-aware application. This means
it requires no changes at all to the source code to add and manipulate authentication
methods. GDM can also be reconfigured to use what is known as a “face browser”;
this is similar to the welcome screen on a Windows XP machine with the icons or
“faces” with each user listed next to the corresponding picture. With the face browser
configured correctly, all a user needs to do is to connect the UMSD and double click
on their face to login.
Configuring the PAM’s for GDM is a relatively straightforward task. Under Gentoo
Linux, application-specific PAM configurations are found in the /etc/pam.d/ folder.
Each application then had a configuration file which corresponds with its name that
contains the PAM options. The required PAM configuration for GDM in this project
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is shown below:
Listing 7.2: PAM configuration for GDM with USBSecure.
#%PAM−1.0
auth s u f f i c i e n t / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam usbsec . so
s e s s i o n r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam motd . so
auth r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam env . so
auth r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam stack . so s e r v i c e=system−auth
auth requ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam nologin . so
account r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam stack . so s e r v i c e=system−auth
password r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam stack . so s e r v i c e=system−auth
s e s s i o n r equ i r ed / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam stack . so s e r v i c e=system−auth
s e s s i o n op t i ona l / l i b / s e c u r i t y /pam console . so
It can be seen in the code above that the pam usbsec module is an authentication
(auth) module. Furthermore it is marked as being sufficient; as discussed earlier, if this
module succeeds then PAM is satisfied that the user is authenticated.
7.4 AutoFS
AutoFS is not a necessary component of the final system. This set of tools automatically
mounts and unmounts filesystems on demand without any user interaction. This was
ideal for the UMSD initially as when the PAM would attempt to access the token
the device would be auto-mounted. It was decided not to use it in the end due to
issues with some computers and the need for a kernel module. Some systems would
not auto-mount properly, failing to initialise on boot and thus failing to auto-mount
any filesystems. Secondly this implementation requires a kernel auto-mount module to
either be loaded or compiled into the kernel. While all 2.6 series Linux kernels feature
this module code, it was undesirable to require kernel level modifications to utilize the
device.
Since AutoFS was not to be used, there was still a need to mount the device prior to
authentication and to unmount it immediately after. This was accomplished by simply
7.5 Utility Programs 50
mounting the device manually using a mount call from the PAM before the token was
to be accessed and unmounting manually just after the token signature was computed.
This was deemed to be acceptable as access to the device is enabled when needed with
minimal effort.
7.5 Utility Programs
A small number of utility programs were created to handle configuring, administering
and querying the system. Currently there are three programs:
• mkconfig
• addtoken
• viewdb
7.5.1 Mkconfig
Mkconfig is used during the initial setup phase to create the configuration file for the
PAM. It creates a usb config struct structure and sets the token path, deny file path
and token database path and writes the structure to the configuration file as a binary
object.
7.5.2 Addtoken
Addtoken creates an entry in the token database and adds the user and token signature
to it. A db struct structure is created to hold the user information in the token
database. The definition of the db struct object is shown below:
Listing 7.3: db struct header definition.
struct db s t ruc t {
char username [ 1 2 8 ] ;
unsigned char tokenmd5 [ 3 3 ] ;
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} ;
Once the structure is created the configuration file is read, followed by the hashing of
the new token. Next the user is prompted for the username to be associated with this
token. It is critical that this username corresponds with one on the system and that
it is entered exactly the same as in the system; this means identical case. Finally the
structure is appended to the end of the token database as a raw binary dump of the
structure data.
7.5.3 Viewdb
Viewdb is a simple utility program to view the contents of the token database. It
outputs every token found in the database, detailing username and token hash. It also
has the ability to check if a token is currently connected and if so, checks who the token
belongs to by indicating on the output if a token is currently attached.
Each of these utilities and the PAM itself all use a shared set of header files. One named
db.h contains the above db struct definition (Listing 7.3) and one named conf.h that
contains the usb config struct definition (Listing 7.1). These are used to ensure that
all functions and programs that require access to these interfaces are always using the
correct version as changing a header file means all dependencies are updated. This
is very important, especially if third party programs are used one day to modify the
token database. The program can simply include these files and it will have correct
definitions of all the structures. If the author simply copies this code directly into their
program, changes to the headers will not be propagated to their software and thus as
a result may cause severe problems or even data corruption.
7.6 An Analysis of the Current Implementation
The current implementation of the security system does have some limitations and
security concerns. Many of these are beyond the scope or control of this project but
still are important to consider. The main issue here is if a hacker gains control of the
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root account on the system. If this occurs, there is zero security left on the system. The
token database, while protected by unauthorised changes through the use of filesystem
permissions, cannot be secured effectively against any root user1.
Root access can be made quite easy for a hacker to gain if a few simple checks or options
are not disabled or reconfigured from default settings or if simple procedures are not
in place. These include:
• Setting a BIOS/CMOS password
• Changing the default boot sequence
• Securing the default Linux boot-loader
• Physically securing the system
7.6.1 BIOS/CMOS Passwords
Having a BIOS or CMOS password set is one of the most basic and most important
steps in securing a system. While these passwords are easy to reset if a hacker can
gain physical access to the systems mainboard, they are the first line of defense in
protecting or enforcing the other options. If the default boot sequence is secured but
no password is set on BIOS, then the hacker can simply enter, change the boot sequence
to something that favours them and reboot.
7.6.2 Boot Sequences
“If a hacker can boot off an external drive, then it’s not your system anymore” (Microsoft
TechNet: 10 Immutable Laws of Security 2005). This is a very real concern, especially
with all the latest Linux Live-CD which allows you to boot up a full-blown Linux
system and access any filesystems on the machine, completely ignoring all filesystem
permissions. If a hacker can boot off a CD, floppy disk or even a UMSD, they can
1The exception to this rule is the immutable permission. When enabled, not even root can change
the standard file permissions (except of course root can remove the immutable permission!)
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change boot-loader settings, create false accounts on the system or in this case, tamper
with the USB secure token database.
7.6.3 Boot-Loaders
Linux boot-loaders are often overlooked by most people as an entry point for hackers.
By default nearly every distribution installs its boot-loader (whether this is LILO or
GRUB) without any password. Many do give the option in setup to add a password,
however the option is usually small and has little or no emphasis drawn to it. By simply
appending the keyword “single” to the kernel options line in the boot-loader, nearly
all Linux distributions will be booted into what is known as ”single user mode”. In
this mode, root access is granted to the console immediately thus allowing a hacker to
bypass all security measures with great ease. Furthermore, a hacker could instruct the
boot-loader to boot some other foreign media, such as a CD, regardless of the BIOS
boot sequence option. This is a simple hole to plug, enabling the password option on
the boot-loader when installing will completely prevent this exploit on any system.
7.6.4 Physical Security
Without any physical security on a system, there is absolutely no point enforcing the
other points above. It is important to note that the amount of physical security is
directly proportional to the sensitivity of the data that needs to be protected. So for a
home user, simply placing a small padlock on the side of the case is ample. A paranoid
user may lock the case in a small cupboard next to the desk. If a business is to take
physical security seriously, servers should be locked in racks which are in turn locked in
a server room. By far the most secure server is one which is powered off, unplugged and
placed in a locked room. This is quite an extreme case, especially because the server
cannot actually do anything then other than take up storage space but the point is
still valid. A secure server is one which has its physical access restricted to authorised
personnel, is constantly patched with all the latest security updates and is continuously
monitored for any suspicion activity.
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The last point there is one that is overlooked all too many times in industry. Many
system administrators will simply secure their servers in a room and ensure all the latest
security patches are applied as they are released and that’s it. They do not monitor
the server logs, check the event viewer, browse the filesystem or even check the running
process list for anything that looks out of the ordinary. For a system to be considered
secure, it must be monitored regularly by some personnel who have reasonably good
knowledge of the system.
7.7 Progress
The device and supporting software is at a usable state. There have been no major
authentication problems in the initial testing phase. Issues were found with the AutoFS
daemon on one of the test machines. Once installed and the devices defined, AutoFS
would simply fail to load, either on system start-up or when manually restarted. Since
AutoFS relies on kernel code to perform access detection and mount/unmount the
filesystem accordingly, the kernel of the problematic machine was inspected and found
to be fine. To be safe, the kernel was recompiled again with no change in the reported
errors.
Another bug was with the PAM conversation functions. These functions allow devel-
opers to pass messages from the PAM to the calling application, such as “Please enter
password” or “Swipe access card now”. Two conversations were initially coded into
the module; one for a successful login and one for a failed login. On successful logins,
the message was displayed correctly however failed logins initially displayed the correct
message but as the module progressed, it began to fail.
In worst cases this fault would cause GDM to restart rather than simply exiting and
letting the secondary login system work. This was remedied by simply commenting
out the conversation code for failures. It is unknown why this problem has occurred.
Further investigation by running GDM through a debugger such as gdb and monitoring
the segmentation faults and/or exceptions is probably the only way to resolve this issue.
The final device does not perform any encryption on the token. It was hoped to use
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Gnu Privacy Guard (GPG) to encrypt the token so it could not be tampered with.
After researching control of GPG by a third-party application (namely the PAM) it
was found that the GPG Made Easy (GPGME) library was the best system for the
job. GPGME is an API that is suppose to make interfacing with a GPG installation
relatively straightforward. Anything that needs to be done can be coded into an ap-
plication directly and executed by the library at runtime. Unfortunately, GPGME was
quite difficult to grasp. It does come with many examples but these either did not
work as expected or were too complicated to reproduce in the PAM. In the end it was
decided to drop the encryption of the token and use a much simpler Message Digest 5
(MD5) hash of the token file.
While it may seem like not encrypting the token has significantly reduced the security
this device can provide, it should be noted that as long as the token is kept reasonably
secure, the security is no different to that of an encrypted token since the hacker cannot
obtain a copy of the token file. A simple example, most people would not give their car
keys or their credit card to someone they do not trust. If the same logic is applied to
the UMSD then it is obvious that there is no loss in system security. Sure if a hacker
obtains the device they could duplicate it, but it is also the same as giving a set of car
keys to a valet; they could duplicate the key and then have full access to that vehicle!
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7.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered all the required software components for the project. A detailed
overview of the PAM was shown, including file definitions for important data structures.
The Gnome Display Manager is the application that was tested to use the USB security
device. A sample PAM configuration for GDMwas also shown, examplifying how simple
configuring new authentication methods for existing PAM-aware applications can be.
The software also has a handful of supporting utility programs to perform system main-
tenance and gather information for administrators. Three programs were developed;
mkconfig, addtoken and viewdb. These allow administrators to create a default usb-
secure.conf configuration file, add a new token to the database and view the known
tokens in the database.
Finally it was shown that there are some ways to get around the security provided by
the device. All of these are common sense issues though and thus should already be
taken care of if the systems are administered by competent IT staff.
Chapter 8
Extending The Security Device
This chapter outlines enhancing the device to operate in a networked environment,
similar to ones present in large enterprises.
8.1 Network/Distributed Authentication
Without some form of network authentication, the potential applications for the device
are quite limited. An enterprise would definitely not consider a system that could not
be deployed and managed over a network to a large number of computers. There is
no way they would implement an authentication system whereby each machine has its
own list of users to authenticate to, it would become unwieldy very quickly!
There are two approaches that could be taken to implement a network-enabled version
of the device:
• A fully networked system using a single authentication server to process all au-
thentication requests.
• A fully networked system using a local database for authentication, but with the
ability to automatically import keys from surrounding computers.
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8.2 Client/Server Approach
The first approach is typical of most network systems currently available. NT Domain
Authentication is a prime example. For a workstation to be logged onto the network it
must be validated by a domain logon server or else it is denied access to any resources
on the network. Appling the same idea to the device, the local token database would be
moved to a central server and the direct file access commands replaced with networking
code.
Storing all the tokens on a central server is a good choice from an administration stand-
point. There is only one machine that needs to be secured well, after all the hackers
will have to target the server now to compromise the token database. Furthermore,
revoking a token is easy as there is only one system that needs updating, there is no
need to iterate through all the machines in a business, searching for a particular token
and revoking it when found.
8.3 Distributed/Peer to Peer Approach
The second approach is a much more elegant one. In this design there does not need to
be a central token server, machines can send authentication requests to one-another.
Each machine maintains a local token database as per the normal setup however there
is one fundamental change; if a device is connected and it is not found in the local
database, the machine can send a request to other machines for the token.
In this scenario a web of trust is created. A machine will trust itself and one or more
other machines. If a machine cannot handle a request, it is allowed to pass it up the
web a predetermined number of times. The beauty of this system means that a central
token server can still be sitting at the top of the web but would not usually be queried
on every logon as some machine below would have the desired token in its database.
A typical logon session may go something like this:
1. A user connects their token device to a workstation.
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2. The system checks the token and cannot locate it in its local database.
3. The system then sends a request to the first machine from its trust list and asks
whether it has the token in its database.
4. If the queried machine has the token and it is valid, it sends a validation response
to the user’s workstation. If the machine does not know the token, it sends an
unknown response to the user’s workstation and optionally can inform the user’s
workstation of the computers it trusts to aid the user’s workstation in locating
the token. This step (4) is then repeated.
5. The user’s workstation then adds the token to its database automatically, however
it sets a remote trust flag that signifies that the token is trusted from a remote
source.
6. The user is then logged in as if their token was in the local database the entire
time.
In step 5 it is mentioned that a remote trust flag is set to signify the token is remotely
trusted. This is done so automatic revocation can be performed. If at a later date a
user’s token is revoked or deleted, it will be removed from the system with the initial
local copy however any system that logged the same user in remotely from the trust
this machine provided will still allow the user to login. With the remote trust flags
in place, the system will realise when the user connects the token that it is remotely
trusted and will then send a validation request to the machine the provided that trust
initially to see if the token is still valid. The remote machine will then return a token
revoked message and the system will deny the user access to the system and remove
the token from the local database.
Another important use for the remote trust flag is to ensure that if someone asks a
machine to check for a token, it must not return a validation response unless the token
is trusted locally. If it remotely trusts a token it should return a remotely trusted
message with the name of the system that locally trusts that particular token. That
way the system requesting validation can ask the machine with the token directly.
The other important consideration for the distributed method is how to exchange data
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from one machine to another. A possible solution is to use the Secure Shell (SSH)
protocol with host keys. Each machine runs an SSH server and has an associated host
key. For a machine to trust another, it must have the remote machines host key stored
in its local .authorized keys file. This will then allow the machine to connect securely
and seamlessly to the other machine with no other required information.
Data can then be passed to and from each machine. Commands such as “Do you have
this token?” or data such as the MD5 hash for a token may be passed with little effort.
Furthermore, this approach would allow trusted computers to not only be on the local
network, but anywhere across the internet. Since all communications using this method
are secured quite well with SSH, there is no worry as to the integrity of the data in
transit from one machine to another.
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8.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter has described the basic framework for distributed authentication system
that could enable the use of this security device in a networked environment. A conven-
tional client/server architecture was briefly touched on before a detailed description of
a peer to peer based authentication system was given. This system works by creating
a “web of trust” between the computers (and if required, servers too) on the network.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Further Work
This chapter concludes the dissertation. The objectives stated at the beginning are
compared with the results achieved on the completion of the project. Furthermore, a
brief discussion of further work that may be performed in the future that may improve
the quality of the system.
9.1 Achievement of Project Objectives
The following objectives have been addressed:
9.1.1 Researching
1. Research the current state of authentication systems for both Linux and Windows
operating systems.
2. Research the benefits of such a device in the public domain, including social and
economic issues of all involved parties.
3. Research cryptography and copy protection methods implemented on various media
and security devices.
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Chapter 3 detailed the current authentication systems used in Linux-based operat-
ing systems. The specification also stated that research was to be conducted for the
Windows operating system however this was not completed fully. A broad overview
of security devices available was conducted, covering both Smart Cards and Biomet-
ric Authentication Devices. Two commercially available authentication systems were
also compared; Cryptocard and Dekart Logon. Cryptocard supports a wider range of
operating systems, but is more expensive than the Windows-only Dekart Logon.
The benefits gained by such a hardware-based security device was most evidently por-
trayed in Chapter 2. If hackers need a physical device to gain access to a system then
Social Engineering attacks will drop significantly. The characteristics of a good Social
Engineer were also discussed. The purpose of these qualities are to help hackers extract
information from their victims efficiently but these of course would be rendered useless
if a hacker was up against a two-factor authentication system.
Protection against token/device duplication is an important aspect of a security system.
Chapter 4 described how some of the most common forms of copy protection for optical
media are achieved. It then shows how these protections can then be circumvented
with common software packages available on the internet. Since a UMSD is quite
open, protection against duplication must be done within the token possibly by using
a single-use access code and embedding this into the token after every logon.
9.1.2 Design and Implementation
4. Using a USB flash device as the underlying hardware, design and implement a
security device under a Linux-based operating system.
The security device was created using a number of software components plus a USB
flash drive. These software components comprise of a PAM, GDM and three utility
programs. The PAM was developed using an existing module for the inital framework
and then expanded with further code to load a configuration file, open a token file and
compute a MD5 hash and then compare this hash to one from a local database. If the
hash corresponds with the correct entry in the database a success message is returned
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to GDM and the user is logged into their account without any further interaction. The
addition of token signatures to the database is handled by one of the supporting utility
programs. The other two programs allow administrators to view the token database
and create an initial configuration file.
Since GDM is already a PAM-aware application, no modifications to the code were
required to fully utilise the module. GDM successfully logged the test user in every the
time. GDM was also configured to drop back to a password box on an unsuccessfull
USB logon.
9.1.3 Evaluation of the Device
5. Analyse the performance of the device in terms of robustness, security and error-
recovery.
There were some initial debugging issues that caused numerous errors, mainly with
PAM conversations. After these setbacks, the authentication performance has been
exceptional. When a user clicks OK there is no noticeable delay while the PAM checks
the token. The other programming issues encountered were with the GPG Made Easy
Library. It was not successfully integrated into the USB security system and as a result,
the token has no encryption. This is not a grave concern as outlined in Chapter 7.
9.2 Further Objectives
6. Research the issues related to the implementation and porting of the security device
software on other Operating Systems including Windows NT based OS and Mac OS X.
Since this device is designed to work on Linux-based systems only, there have been
discussions arising throughout the project as to the feasibility of porting the security
device to other operating systems, namely Microsoft Windows and Mac OS. In porting,
there are a few areas that must be considered and evaluated thoroughly to ensure the
functionality and integrity of the device. These are:
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• Integration with authentication subsystems
• Choice of programming language and compiler
• Availability of system documentation
• Ability to port code inline or fork code-base
By far the biggest challenge is interfacing with the authentication system built into the
operating system. Under Windows this is difficult to achieve at best of times; due in
part to the closed-source nature of Windows. Microsoft does not release the source code
for its OS’s (or nearly anything they produce for that matter) and this makes developing
software to mesh with their products hard to achieve. They do have a comprehensive
Application Programming Interface (API) for their products, but these still do not give
the developer any indication how the system is performing those functions. This makes
low-level Windows programming slow and complex. Furthermore, a driver developer
kit is usually required to develop device drivers with any hope of success.
These obstacles are greatly reduced under Mac OS, Mac OS X in particular. This OS
is build upon a BSD base, named Darwin in Apple’s case and as a result gives the OS
a Unix-like feel especially when programming. Furthermore, Apple has been releasing
the Darwin portion of Mac OS X to the public for free, making it easier for developers
to get their hands on a copy. Darwin does not contain any graphical components of
Mac OS X and as a result cannot be used solely as the development platform although
it is a good place to start for low-level programming tasks such as device access.
7. Design and implement a basic client/server system allowing the device to support
roaming amongst different systems.
Chapter 8 outlines two approaches to network-enabling the security device. The first
method involves a conventional client/server relationship. This may simply be a central
token server or something more highly integrated, such as a Microsoft Windows Server
with an Active Directory syncronised with the token signatures.
The second method involves a distributed approach. Each machine trusts at least one
other machine for authentication information. When a user wishes to logon, if the
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machine does not know the user from its local database, it can send a request to any
machine it trusts in the hope that one will trust this user. This method could be
secured by using SSH to interface between machines.
9.3 Further Work
This project is currently in the infancy stage; there are many improvements that can
be made. These include but are by no means restricted to:
• Addition of a Graphical User Interface (GUI) for the management of the security
devices features.
• Encryption of the token.
• Addition of a single-use code to the token.
It would also be favourable to have the code inspected by another developer (or two).
The code is still messy at best in some parts. Any review of the code would ensure
that any design flaws or pitfalls that the initial developer may have missed would be
corrected in future revisions.
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Figure B.2: Successful Logon
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C.1 Header Files
Listing C.1: conf.h code listing.
// con f . h − Con f i g u r a t i on Header
// Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
#ifndef CONFIG H
#define CONFIG H
// d e f a u l t c o n f i g f i l e pa th f o r t e s t i n g purpose s
#define CONFFILE ”/mnt/homes/matthew/uni / p r o j e c t / e tc / usbsecure . conf ”
struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t {
char t o k e n f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
char d eny f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
char db f i l e [ 4 0 9 6 ] ;
} ;
#endif
Listing C.2: db.h code listing.
// db . h − Token da ta ba s e header
// Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
#ifndef DB H
#define DB H
struct db s t ruc t {
char username [ 1 2 8 ] ;
unsigned char tokenmd5 [ 3 3 ] ;
} ;
#endif
Listing C.3: md5.h code listing.
// Part o f t h e MD5.C l i b r a r y
#ifndef MD5 H
#define MD5 H
#ifndef uint8
#define uint8 unsigned char
#endif
#ifndef uint32
#define uint32 unsigned long int
#endif
typedef struct
{
uint32 t o t a l [ 2 ] ;
u int32 s t a t e [ 4 ] ;
u int8 bu f f e r [ 6 4 ] ;
}
md5 context ;
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int do md5 f i l e ( char ∗ f i l e , unsigned char ∗thesum ) ;
void md5 starts ( md5 context ∗ ctx ) ;
void md5 update ( md5 context ∗ctx , u int8 ∗ input , u int32 length ) ;
void md5 f in i sh ( md5 context ∗ctx , u int8 d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] ) ;
#endif /∗ md5 . h ∗/
C.2 Program Files
Listing C.4: pam usbsec.c code listing.
/∗ pam usbsec module ∗/
/∗
∗ $ Id : pam permit . c , v 1 .3 2004/09/22 09 : 37 : 49 kukuk Exp $
∗
∗ Writ ten by Andrew Morgan <morgan@parc . power . net> 1996/3/11
∗
∗ Now pam usbsec , by Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
∗
∗/
#define DEFAULT USER ”nobody”
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t d l i b . h>
#include <sys / s t a t . h>
#include <s t r i n g . h>
/∗
∗ here , we make d e f i n i t i o n s f o r t h e e x t e r n a l l y a c c e s s i b l e f u n c t i o n s
∗ in t h i s f i l e ( t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s are r e q u i r e d f o r s t a t i c modules
∗ bu t s t r o n g l y encouraged g e n e r a l l y ) t h ey are used to i n s t r u c t t h e
∗ modules i n c l u d e f i l e t o d e f i n e t h e i r p r o t o t y p e s .
∗/
#define PAM SM AUTH
#define PAM SMACCOUNT
#define PAM SM SESSION
#define PAM SMPASSWORD
#include <s e c u r i t y /pam modules . h>
#include <s e c u r i t y / pam macros . h>
// our i n c l u d e s
#include ”md5 . h”
#include ” conf . h”
#include ”db . h”
/∗ −−− a u t h e n t i c a t i o n management f u n c t i o n s −−− ∗/
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm authenticate ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc , const char ∗∗argv )
{
int r e t v a l ;
const char ∗user=NULL;
struct pam conv ∗ conver sa t i on ;
struct pam message message ;
struct pam message ∗pmessage = &message ;
struct pam response ∗ resp = NULL;
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struct s t a t s t ;
FILE∗ l o g f i l e = fopen ( ”/tmp/LOG. usbsec ” , ”a” ) ;
fput s ( ”Begin l ogg ing . ” , l o g f i l e ) ;
fput s ( ”\n” , l o g f i l e ) ;
//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// here we read the c o n f i g f i l e , i t i s a b ina ry one wi th a c o n f i g s t r u c t
struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t c on f i g ;
FILE ∗ c o n f f i l e = fopen (CONFFILE, ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ( f r ead ( &conf ig , 1 , s izeof ( struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t ) , c o n f f i l e ) ) < 1 )
{
// e r r o r r ead ing f i l e
f c l o s e ( c o n f f i l e ) ;
return PAM AUTH ERR;
}
// f c l o s e ( c o n f f i l e ) ;
//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// put t h e s e messages in a f i l e
char t e l l them [ ] = ”USBsecure i s a c t i v e but an authent i ca t i on e r r o r was found . ” ;
char goodie [ ] = ”Valid Token Found , USBSecure Logon Suc e s s f u l . ” ;
message . msg s ty l e = PAM TEXT INFO;
message .msg = te l l them ;
/∗
∗ a u t h e n t i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s we know who the user wants to be
∗/
r e t v a l = pam get user (pamh , &user , NULL) ;
i f ( r e t v a l != PAM SUCCESS) {
D(( ” get user returned e r r o r : %s ” , pam stre r ro r (pamh , r e t v a l ) ) ) ;
return r e t v a l ;
}
i f ( user == NULL | | ∗user == ’ \0 ’ ) {
D(( ”username not known” ) ) ;
r e t v a l = pam set item (pamh , PAM USER, ( const void ∗) DEFAULT USER) ;
i f ( r e t v a l != PAM SUCCESS)
return PAMUSERUNKNOWN;
}
//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// check f o r a deny f i l e , t h i s i s /tmp/ pam usbsec . deny
FILE ∗ d eny f i l e = fopen ( c on f i g . d eny f i l e , ” r ” ) ;
int tokva l = 0 ;
i f ( ’ k ’ != ( char ) f g e t c ( d e ny f i l e ) ){
f c l o s e ( d e ny f i l e ) ;
tokva l = 1 ;
}
f c l o s e ( d e ny f i l e ) ;
i f ( tokva l != 0) {
return PAM AUTH ERR;
}
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//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// ok , so now i f we are here then us b s e c i s a v a l i d means and we must check t h e token
// g e t t h e tokenmd5 f o r t h e g i v en user
FILE ∗ db f i l e = fopen ( c on f i g . db f i l e , ” rb” ) ;
struct db s t ruc t userdata ;
unsigned char tokensum [ 3 3 ] ;
int tokenfound = 0 ;
i f ( ! d b f i l e ){
p r i n t f ( ”Error read ing db f i l e \n” ) ;
f p r i n t f ( l o g f i l e , ” e r r o r read ing db f i l e ” ) ;
f c l o s e ( l o g f i l e ) ;
return 127 ;
}
while ( ( f r ead ( &userdata , 1 , s izeof ( struct db s t ruc t ) , d b f i l e ) ) > 0 )
{
f p r i n t f ( l o g f i l e , ”Username : %s\n Token MD5: %s” , userdata . username ,
userdata . tokenmd5 ) ;
i f ( ! strcmp ( user , userdata . username ) ){
s t r cpy ( tokensum , userdata . tokenmd5 ) ;
tokenfound++;
f p r i n t f ( l o g f i l e , ” found use r s token\n” ) ;
}
f p r i n t f ( l o g f i l e , ” and the new tokenmd5 i s %s tokenfound %d\n” , tokensum ,
tokenfound ) ;
}
user = NULL; /∗ c l e an up ∗/
f c l o s e ( d b f i l e ) ;
f c l o s e ( l o g f i l e ) ;
i f ( ! tokenfound ){
// the token was not found , e x i t
return PAM AUTH ERR;
}
// the b i g check here − s ee i f t h e s i g n a t u r e s match
i f ( do md5 f i l e ( c on f i g . t o k en f i l e , tokensum ) ){
return PAM AUTH ERR;
}
// i f we reach here , t h e user i s a u t h e n t i c a t e d s u c c e s s f u l l y
message .msg = goodie ;
i f ( pam get item (pamh , PAMCONV, ( const void ∗∗)&conver sa t i on ) == PAM SUCCESS &&
conver sa t i on ) {
conversat ion−>conv (1 , ( const struct pam message ∗∗)&pmessage , &resp ,
conversat ion−>appdata ptr ) ;
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i f ( resp ) pam drop reply ( resp , 1) ;
}
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm setcred ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc
, const char ∗∗argv )
{
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
/∗ −−− account management f u n c t i o n s −−− ∗/
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm acct mgmt ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc
, const char ∗∗argv )
{
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
/∗ −−− password management −−− ∗/
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm chauthtok ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc
, const char ∗∗argv )
{
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
/∗ −−− s e s s i o n management −−− ∗/
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm open sess ion ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc
, const char ∗∗argv )
{
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
PAMEXTERN
int pam sm c lo s e s e s s i on ( pam handle t ∗pamh , int f l a g s , int argc
, const char ∗∗argv )
{
return PAM SUCCESS;
}
/∗ end o f module d e f i n i t i o n ∗/
#ifde f PAM STATIC
/∗ s t a t i c module data ∗/
struct pam module pam permit modstruct = {
”pam permit” ,
pam sm authenticate ,
pam sm setcred ,
pam sm acct mgmt ,
pam sm open session ,
pam sm close se s s ion ,
pam sm chauthtok
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} ;
#endif
Listing C.5: md5.c code listing.
/∗
∗ RFC 1321 comp l ian t MD5 imp lementa t ion
∗
∗ Copyr i gh t (C) 2001−2003 Chr i s t ophe Devine
∗
∗ This program i s f r e e s o f twa r e ; you can r e d i s t r i b u t e i t and/ or modi fy
∗ i t under t h e terms o f t h e GNU General Pub l i c L i cense as p u b l i s h e d by
∗ t h e Free So f tware Foundation ; e i t h e r v e r s i o n 2 o f t h e License , or
∗ ( a t your op t i on ) any l a t e r v e r s i o n .
∗
∗ This program i s d i s t r i b u t e d in t h e hope t h a t i t w i l l be u s e f u l ,
∗ bu t WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; w i t hou t even the imp l i e d warranty o f
∗ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See t h e
∗ GNU General Pub l i c L i cense f o r more d e t a i l s .
∗
∗ You shou l d have r e c e i v e d a copy o f t h e GNU Genera l Pub l i c L i cense
∗ a long w i th t h i s program ; i f not , w r i t e to t h e Free So f tware
∗ Foundation , Inc . , 59 Temple Place , Su i t e 330 , Boston , MA 02111−1307 USA
∗/
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include ”md5 . h”
#define GET UINT32(n , b , i ) \
{ \
(n) = ( ( uint32 ) (b) [ ( i ) ] ) \
| ( ( u int32 ) (b) [ ( i ) + 1 ] << 8 ) \
| ( ( u int32 ) (b) [ ( i ) + 2 ] << 16 ) \
| ( ( u int32 ) (b) [ ( i ) + 3 ] << 24 ) ; \
}
#define PUT UINT32(n , b , i ) \
{ \
(b) [ ( i ) ] = ( uint8 ) ( (n) ) ; \
(b) [ ( i ) + 1 ] = ( uint8 ) ( (n) >> 8 ) ; \
(b) [ ( i ) + 2 ] = ( uint8 ) ( (n) >> 16 ) ; \
(b) [ ( i ) + 3 ] = ( uint8 ) ( (n) >> 24 ) ; \
}
int do md5 f i l e ( char ∗ f i l e , unsigned char ∗thesum ){
FILE ∗ t o k e n f i l e = fopen ( f i l e , ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ! t o k e n f i l e ){
return 127 ;
}
md5 context ctx ;
int i , j ;
char buf [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
unsigned char md5sum [ 1 6 ] ;
md5 starts ( &ctx ) ;
while ( ( i = f r ead ( buf , 1 , s izeof ( buf ) , t o k e n f i l e ) ) > 0 )
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{
md5 update ( &ctx , buf , i ) ;
}
md5 f in i sh ( &ctx , md5sum ) ;
for ( j = 0 ; j < 16 ; j++ )
{
s p r i n t f ( buf + j ∗ 2 , ”%02x” , md5sum [ j ] ) ;
}
f c l o s e ( t o k e n f i l e ) ;
i f ( memcmp( buf , thesum , 32 ) )
{
return 1 ;
} else {
// md5 was good ,
return 0 ;
}
// i f we g e t here , someth ings broked
return 1 ;
}
void md5 starts ( md5 context ∗ ctx )
{
ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] = 0 ;
ctx−>t o t a l [ 1 ] = 0 ;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 0 ] = 0x67452301 ;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 1 ] = 0xEFCDAB89;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 2 ] = 0x98BADCFE;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 3 ] = 0x10325476 ;
}
void md5 process ( md5 context ∗ctx , u int8 data [ 6 4 ] )
{
uint32 X[ 1 6 ] , A, B, C, D;
GET UINT32( X[ 0 ] , data , 0 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 ] , data , 4 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 2 ] , data , 8 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 3 ] , data , 12 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 4 ] , data , 16 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 5 ] , data , 20 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 6 ] , data , 24 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 7 ] , data , 28 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 8 ] , data , 32 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 9 ] , data , 36 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 0 ] , data , 40 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 1 ] , data , 44 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 2 ] , data , 48 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 3 ] , data , 52 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 4 ] , data , 56 ) ;
GET UINT32( X[ 1 5 ] , data , 60 ) ;
#define S(x , n) ( ( x << n) | ( ( x & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 − n) ) )
#define P(a , b , c , d , k , s , t ) \
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{ \
a += F(b , c , d) + X[ k ] + t ; a = S(a , s ) + b ; \
}
A = ctx−>s t a t e [ 0 ] ;
B = ctx−>s t a t e [ 1 ] ;
C = ctx−>s t a t e [ 2 ] ;
D = ctx−>s t a t e [ 3 ] ;
#define F(x , y , z ) ( z ˆ (x & (y ˆ z ) ) )
P( A, B, C, D, 0 , 7 , 0xD76AA478 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 1 , 12 , 0xE8C7B756 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 2 , 17 , 0x242070DB ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 3 , 22 , 0xC1BDCEEE ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 4 , 7 , 0xF57C0FAF ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 5 , 12 , 0x4787C62A ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 6 , 17 , 0xA8304613 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 7 , 22 , 0xFD469501 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 8 , 7 , 0x698098D8 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 9 , 12 , 0x8B44F7AF ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 10 , 17 , 0xFFFF5BB1 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 11 , 22 , 0x895CD7BE ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 12 , 7 , 0x6B901122 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 13 , 12 , 0xFD987193 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 14 , 17 , 0xA679438E ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 15 , 22 , 0x49B40821 ) ;
#undef F
#define F(x , y , z ) ( y ˆ ( z & (x ˆ y ) ) )
P( A, B, C, D, 1 , 5 , 0xF61E2562 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 6 , 9 , 0xC040B340 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 11 , 14 , 0x265E5A51 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 0 , 20 , 0xE9B6C7AA ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 5 , 5 , 0xD62F105D ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 10 , 9 , 0x02441453 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 15 , 14 , 0xD8A1E681 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 4 , 20 , 0xE7D3FBC8 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 9 , 5 , 0x21E1CDE6 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 14 , 9 , 0xC33707D6 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 3 , 14 , 0xF4D50D87 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 8 , 20 , 0x455A14ED ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 13 , 5 , 0xA9E3E905 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 2 , 9 , 0xFCEFA3F8 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 7 , 14 , 0x676F02D9 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 12 , 20 , 0x8D2A4C8A ) ;
#undef F
#define F(x , y , z ) ( x ˆ y ˆ z )
P( A, B, C, D, 5 , 4 , 0xFFFA3942 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 8 , 11 , 0x8771F681 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 11 , 16 , 0x6D9D6122 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 14 , 23 , 0xFDE5380C ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 1 , 4 , 0xA4BEEA44 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 4 , 11 , 0x4BDECFA9 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 7 , 16 , 0xF6BB4B60 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 10 , 23 , 0xBEBFBC70 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 13 , 4 , 0x289B7EC6 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 0 , 11 , 0xEAA127FA ) ;
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P( C, D, A, B, 3 , 16 , 0xD4EF3085 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 6 , 23 , 0x04881D05 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 9 , 4 , 0xD9D4D039 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 12 , 11 , 0xE6DB99E5 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 15 , 16 , 0x1FA27CF8 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 2 , 23 , 0xC4AC5665 ) ;
#undef F
#define F(x , y , z ) ( y ˆ (x | ˜z ) )
P( A, B, C, D, 0 , 6 , 0xF4292244 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 7 , 10 , 0x432AFF97 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 14 , 15 , 0xAB9423A7 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 5 , 21 , 0xFC93A039 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 12 , 6 , 0x655B59C3 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 3 , 10 , 0x8F0CCC92 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 10 , 15 , 0xFFEFF47D ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 1 , 21 , 0x85845DD1 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 8 , 6 , 0x6FA87E4F ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 15 , 10 , 0xFE2CE6E0 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 6 , 15 , 0xA3014314 ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 13 , 21 , 0x4E0811A1 ) ;
P( A, B, C, D, 4 , 6 , 0xF7537E82 ) ;
P( D, A, B, C, 11 , 10 , 0xBD3AF235 ) ;
P( C, D, A, B, 2 , 15 , 0x2AD7D2BB ) ;
P( B, C, D, A, 9 , 21 , 0xEB86D391 ) ;
#undef F
ctx−>s t a t e [ 0 ] += A;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 1 ] += B;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 2 ] += C;
ctx−>s t a t e [ 3 ] += D;
}
void md5 update ( md5 context ∗ctx , u int8 ∗ input , u int32 length )
{
uint32 l e f t , f i l l ;
i f ( ! l ength ) return ;
l e f t = ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] & 0x3F ;
f i l l = 64 − l e f t ;
ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] += length ;
ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
i f ( ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] < l ength )
ctx−>t o t a l [1]++;
i f ( l e f t && length >= f i l l )
{
memcpy( (void ∗) ( ctx−>bu f f e r + l e f t ) ,
(void ∗) input , f i l l ) ;
md5 process ( ctx , ctx−>bu f f e r ) ;
l ength −= f i l l ;
input += f i l l ;
l e f t = 0 ;
}
while ( l ength >= 64 )
{
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md5 process ( ctx , input ) ;
l ength −= 64;
input += 64 ;
}
i f ( l ength )
{
memcpy( (void ∗) ( ctx−>bu f f e r + l e f t ) ,
(void ∗) input , l ength ) ;
}
}
stat ic uint8 md5 padding [ 6 4 ] =
{
0x80 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
} ;
void md5 f in i sh ( md5 context ∗ctx , u int8 d i g e s t [ 1 6 ] )
{
uint32 l a s t , padn ;
u int32 high , low ;
u int8 msglen [ 8 ] ;
high = ( ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] >> 29 )
| ( ctx−>t o t a l [ 1 ] << 3 ) ;
low = ( ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] << 3 ) ;
PUT UINT32( low , msglen , 0 ) ;
PUT UINT32( high , msglen , 4 ) ;
l a s t = ctx−>t o t a l [ 0 ] & 0x3F ;
padn = ( l a s t < 56 ) ? ( 56 − l a s t ) : ( 120 − l a s t ) ;
md5 update ( ctx , md5 padding , padn ) ;
md5 update ( ctx , msglen , 8 ) ;
PUT UINT32( ctx−>s t a t e [ 0 ] , d ige s t , 0 ) ;
PUT UINT32( ctx−>s t a t e [ 1 ] , d ige s t , 4 ) ;
PUT UINT32( ctx−>s t a t e [ 2 ] , d ige s t , 8 ) ;
PUT UINT32( ctx−>s t a t e [ 3 ] , d ige s t , 12 ) ;
}
#ifde f TEST
#include <s t d l i b . h>
#include <s t d i o . h>
/∗
∗ t h o s e are t h e s tandard RFC 1321 t e s t v e c t o r s
∗/
stat ic char ∗msg [ ] =
{
”” ,
”a” ,
”abc” ,
”message d i g e s t ” ,
” abcdefghi jklmnopqrstuvwxyz ” ,
”ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789” ,
” 12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012” \
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”345678901234567890”
} ;
stat ic char ∗ va l [ ] =
{
” d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e ” ,
”0 cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661 ” ,
”900150983 cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72 ” ,
” f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0 ” ,
” c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b ” ,
” d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f ” ,
”57 edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a ”
} ;
int main ( int argc , char ∗argv [ ] )
{
FILE ∗ f ;
int i , j ;
char output [ 3 3 ] ;
md5 context ctx ;
unsigned char buf [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
unsigned char md5sum [ 1 6 ] ;
i f ( argc < 2 )
{
p r i n t f ( ”\n MD5 Val idat ion Tests :\n\n” ) ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < 7 ; i++ )
{
p r i n t f ( ” Test %d ” , i + 1 ) ;
md5 starts ( &ctx ) ;
md5 update ( &ctx , ( u int8 ∗) msg [ i ] , s t r l e n ( msg [ i ] ) ) ;
md5 f in i sh ( &ctx , md5sum ) ;
for ( j = 0 ; j < 16 ; j++ )
{
s p r i n t f ( output + j ∗ 2 , ”%02x” , md5sum [ j ] ) ;
}
i f ( memcmp( output , va l [ i ] , 32 ) )
{
p r i n t f ( ” f a i l e d !\n” ) ;
return ( 1 ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( ” passed .\n” ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( ”\n” ) ;
}
else
{
i f ( ! ( f = fopen ( argv [ 1 ] , ” rb” ) ) )
{
per ro r ( ” fopen ” ) ;
return ( 1 ) ;
}
md5 starts ( &ctx ) ;
while ( ( i = f r ead ( buf , 1 , s izeof ( buf ) , f ) ) > 0 )
{
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md5 update ( &ctx , buf , i ) ;
}
md5 f in i sh ( &ctx , md5sum ) ;
for ( j = 0 ; j < 16 ; j++ )
{
p r i n t f ( ”%02x” , md5sum [ j ] ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( ” %s\n” , argv [ 1 ] ) ;
}
return ( 0 ) ;
}
#endif
Listing C.6: mkconfig.c code listing.
// mkconf ig − makes a con f f i l e f o r pam usbsec
// By Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include <s t r i n g . h>
#include ” conf . h”
int main (void ){
// make a c on f i g s t r u c t u r e
struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t c on f i g ;
// now s e t t h e pa th s
// d e v e l o p e r d e f a u l t pa th s f o r t e s t i n g
s t r cpy ( c on f i g . t o k en f i l e , ”/tmp/ token” ) ;
s t r cpy ( c on f i g . d eny f i l e , ”/tmp/pam usbsec . deny” ) ;
s t r cpy ( c on f i g . db f i l e , ”/tmp/usbsec . db” ) ;
// and f i n a l l y w r i t e t h e s t r u c t u r e out as a b ina ry f i l e
FILE ∗ c o n f f i l e = fopen (CONFFILE, ”wb” ) ;
i f ( ( fw r i t e ( &conf ig , s izeof ( struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t ) , 1 , c o n f f i l e ) ) != 1){
p r i n t f ( ”Error Writing St ructure data !\n” ) ;
} else {
p r i n t f ( ” F i l e wr i t t en s u c e s s f u l l y .\n” ) ;
}
f c l o s e ( c o n f f i l e ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Listing C.7: addtoken.c code listing.
// addtoken − adds a token to t h e da ta ba s e
//
// By Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include ” conf . h”
#include ”md5 . h”
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#include ”db . h”
int main (void ){
struct db s t ruc t userdata ;
//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// here we read the c o n f i g f i l e , i t i s a b ina ry one wi th a c o n f i g s t r u c t
struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t c on f i g ;
FILE ∗ c o n f f i l e = fopen (CONFFILE, ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ( f r ead ( &conf ig , 1 , s izeof ( struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t ) , c o n f f i l e ) ) < 1 )
{
// e r r o r r ead ing f i l e
p r i n t f ( ”Error load ing usbsecure conf f i l e \n” ) ;
return 1 ;
}
p r i n t f ( ”Using db path as %s\n” , c on f i g . d b f i l e ) ;
p r i n t f ( ”Make sure the USB dev ice has the token created and i s connected .\n” ) ;
// ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// now open i t and md5 the f i l e
FILE ∗ t o k e n f i l e = fopen ( con f i g . t o k en f i l e , ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ! t o k e n f i l e ){
return 127 ;
}
md5 context ctx ;
int i , j ;
char buf [ 1 0 2 4 ] ;
unsigned char md5sum [ 1 6 ] ;
md5 starts ( &ctx ) ;
while ( ( i = f r ead ( buf , 1 , s izeof ( buf ) , t o k e n f i l e ) ) > 0 )
{
md5 update ( &ctx , buf , i ) ;
}
md5 f in i sh ( &ctx , md5sum ) ;
for ( j = 0 ; j < 16 ; j++ )
{
s p r i n t f ( buf + j ∗ 2 , ”%02x” , md5sum [ j ] ) ;
}
f c l o s e ( t o k e n f i l e ) ;
s t r cpy ( userdata . tokenmd5 , buf ) ;
// then ask f o r t h e co r r e spond ing username
p r i n t f ( ” Please ente r the corresponding UNIX username EXACTLY as entered in to the
system : ” ) ;
f g e t s ( userdata . username , 127 , s td in ) ;
i f ( userdata . username [ s t r l e n ( userdata . username )−1] == ’\n ’ ){
userdata . username [ s t r l e n ( userdata . username )−1] = ’ \0 ’ ;
}
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// then save t h e two in a s t r u c t and w r i t e i t t o t h e end o f t h e d b f i l e
FILE ∗ db f i l e = fopen ( c on f i g . db f i l e , ”ab” ) ;
i f ( d b f i l e ){
i f ( ( fw r i t e ( &userdata , s izeof ( struct db s t ruc t ) , 1 , d b f i l e ) ) != 1){
p r i n t f ( ”Error Writing user data !\n” ) ;
} else {
p r i n t f ( ”Userdata wr i t t en ( hope fu l l y ) s u c e s s f u l l y .\n” ) ;
}
} else {
p r i n t f ( ”Error opening f i l e \n” ) ;
}
f c l o s e ( c o n f f i l e ) ;
f c l o s e ( d b f i l e ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Listing C.8: viewdb.c code listing.
// v iewdb − dumps th e c on t en t s o f t h e u s b s e cu r e db
//
// By Matthew Quarisa − Q11215969
#include <s t d i o . h>
#include ” conf . h”
#include ”md5 . h”
#include ”db . h”
// note , we shou l d t r y u s ing arg s here l a t e r
int main (void ){
struct db s t ruc t userdata ;
//
∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
// here we read the c o n f i g f i l e , i t i s a b ina ry one wi th a c o n f i g s t r u c t
struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t c on f i g ;
FILE ∗ c o n f f i l e = fopen (CONFFILE, ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ( f r ead ( &conf ig , 1 , s izeof ( struct u s b c on f i g s t r u c t ) , c o n f f i l e ) ) < 1 )
{
// e r r o r r ead ing f i l e
p r i n t f ( ”Error load ing usbsecure conf f i l e \n” ) ;
return 1 ;
}
p r i n t f ( ”Using db path as %s\n” , c on f i g . d b f i l e ) ;
// now load the f i l e s t r u c t by s t r u c t and dump the data
FILE ∗ db f i l e = fopen ( c on f i g . db f i l e , ” rb” ) ;
i f ( ! d b f i l e ){
p r i n t f ( ”Error read ing db f i l e \n” ) ;
return 127 ;
}
while ( f r ead ( &userdata , 1 , s izeof ( struct db s t ruc t ) , d b f i l e ) )
{
p r i n t f ( ”Username : %s\n Token MD5: %s” , userdata . username , userdata . tokenmd5 ) ;
C.2 Program Files 91
i f ( ! do md5 f i l e ( c on f i g . t o k en f i l e , userdata . tokenmd5 ) ){
p r i n t f ( ” <− Current ly Attached .\n” ) ;
} else {
p r i n t f ( ”\n” ) ;
}
}
f c l o s e ( d b f i l e ) ;
f c l o s e ( c o n f f i l e ) ;
return 0 ;
}
